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FREE-RIDING AND COOPERATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL GAMES
Ana Espínola-Arredondo, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2008
The dissertation examines free-riding behavior and externality problems using game theory
and mechanism design. Specically, I study free-riding behavior in the negotiation process
of International Environmental Agreements. I analyze how countriesnoncompliance in an
environmental agreement a¤ects the results of the bargaining stage. This study explains
why countries fulll non-enforceable treaties and why some countries want to specify high
commitment levels to other countries if there is no international organization that perfectly
enforces the contents of the environmental agreement.
The second part of the thesis studies governmentsconservation programs. I assume that
the production of biodiversity from these programs can generate negative or positive exter-
nalities on those nonparticipating landholders. I identify what the governments optimal
transfer is when externalities are considered. Finally, the third chapter analyses an alter-
native denition of kindness. Specically, we consider that a player (follower) is concerned
about those actions that the other player (leader) does not choose. We show that, without re-
lying on interpersonal payo¤ comparisons (i.e., with strictly individualistic preferences), our
model predicts higher cooperation among the players than standard game-theoretic models.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation uses microeconomic theory to understand environmental problems. Specif-
ically, I study how a local or international authority can solve free-riding problems when it
has to allocate a national or transnational public good.
The rst chapter, Free-riding and cooperation in environmental gamesexamines the
negotiation of an international environmental agreement in which di¤erent countries deter-
mine the (non-enforceable) promises of investment in clean technologies to be included in
the agreement. Furthermore, it analyzes countriesoptimal investment in emission-reducing
technologies, considering that, in addition to the utility that a country perceives from an
improved environmental quality, it is also concerned about the relative fulllment of the
terms specied in the international agreement either by itself or by others. I show, rst, why
countries may prefer to shift most promises of investment in clean technologies to other coun-
tries, despite the fact that these promises are usually non-enforceable by any international
organization. Second, I determine countriesoptimal investments in these technologies, and
analyze how their particular investments depend on how demanding the international agree-
ment is, and on the importance that countries assign to each othersrelative fulllment of
their part of the treaty. The contribution of this chapter to the literature on environmental
games is then twofold. First, it endogenizes the particular commitments that countries in-
clude and sign in the IEA, explaining also why countries care about the specic terms of the
agreement despite these terms being non-enforceable. In contrast, standard environmental
games assume that countries simply decide whether to participate in the IEA. This makes
the specic commitments included in the IEA exogenous to the game. Second, this study
explains the interaction between the specic terms of an agreement and countriesrelative
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fulllment of such agreement, which are considered to be completely independent in the
existing literature.
The second chapter, Green auctions: a biodiversity study of mechanism design with
externalities studies the optimal transfer that the government pays when taking into ac-
count the externality (either negative or positive) created by a landholder who produces
biodiversity. In particular, this paper uses a mechanism design approach to study the biodi-
versity improvement in a territory, where the government is the principal and the landholders
are the agents. I analyze an optimal mechanism that considers multidimensional messages
which includes both the biodiversity improvement of the project and its cost. Additionally,
this mechanism incorporates the externality (either positive or negative) that a biodiversity
project causes in the surrounding agents who decided not to participate. Specically, I as-
sume that externalities enter in the cost function of the nonparticipating landholders. I show
that, in the case of negative externalities, the government will implement a transfer function
which is decreasing in the landholders e¢ ciency level. On the other hand, in the case of a
positive externality, paradoxically the government may be interested in the nonparticipation
of the most e¢ cient landholders.
Finally, the last chapter The importance of Foregone Options: generalizing social com-
parisons in sequential-move gamesis a joint work with Felix Munoz-Garcia. In this study
we recognize the fact that recent experimental evidence supports the inuence of a players
unchosen alternatives on other agents actions. This study examines a tractable theoretical
model of reference-dependent preferences in which individuals compare other playerschosen
actions with respect to their unchosen alternatives. We analyze the equilibrium prediction
in complete information sequential-move games, and compare it with that of standard games
where players are not concerned about unchosen alternatives. We show that, without rely-
ing on interpersonal payo¤ comparisons (i.e., with strictly individualistic preferences), our
model predicts higher cooperation among the players than standard game-theoretic models.
In addition, our framework embodies di¤erent behavioral models, such as social status ac-
quisition and intentions-based reciprocity, as special cases. Finally, we conrm our results in
2
three economic applications: the ultimatum bargaining game, the labor market gift exchange
game, and the sequential public good game.
3
2.0 FREE-RIDING & COOPERATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL GAMES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Multiple international environmental agreements have been implemented in recent years
trying to achieve greater cooperation among countries in their reduction of greenhouse gases,
emissions leading to ozone layer depletion, and many other pollutants. For instance, the
Montreal protocol (1987) and the Kyoto protocol (1997) establish standards for reductions
in the emission (and production) of these environmental damaging products and by-products.
Most of these agreements, however, have been very asymmetrically implemented by those
countries signing them.
Di¤erent economic models have been used to analyze countriesbehavior towards such
international environmental agreements (IEA henceforth), and especially to analyze why
they decide not to carry out the reduction in emissions they sign in these treaties. In
particular, most of them deal with IEA as a standard public good game, in which countries
incur a (private) cost in reducing emissions in their own country, but benet from a (public)
improved global environmental quality. Since, in addition, the private costs from reducing
emissions are usually assumed to be higher than the per country benets of improved world
environmental standards, the amount of pollution that every country decides to reduce in
the Nash equilibrium of the game is clearly below the Pareto e¢ cient level. Hence, the
individual incentives of every country to free-ride on the environmental quality that other
countries provide leads to an under-provision of improved environmental standards.
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Despite the fact that the equilibrium resulting from these models predicts the commonly
observed practice of free-riding in environmental games, there are some observed behaviors
that are di¢ cult to rationalize. First, why do countries want to impose high commitment
levels on other signatories if there is no international organization that perfectly enforces
the content of the IEA? And second, why do certain countries respect the agreements they
acquire in IEAs to a great extent (in spite of their non-enforceability), while others do not
fulll their agreements? This paper proposes a model that supports, rst, the interest of a
country in imposing high demands on other countries in terms of the reduction of emissions
the IEA species for themduring the negotiation stage of the IEA, in spite of the non-
enforceability of such agreements. In addition, it explains why certain countries may prefer
to invest in emission-reducing technologies even when other countries do not invest, and how
this optimal investment depends on how demanding (or conservative) the goals of the IEA
are, among other parameters.
Similar to standard public good games, this study considers that every country benets
from the global environmental quality achieved by the overall reduction in emissions, and
it incurs a private cost in doing so. In addition, the paper assumes that countries benet
from the relative fulllment of the agreement (i.e., the extent to which the goal of the IEA is
fullled). Specically, I consider that countries can benet from the relative fulllment
of the IEA because of their own and/or because of other countries relative fulllment
of the agreement.1 In the rst case, countries benet from respecting the terms of the
IEA since deviating from their environmental commitments may be severely punished by
environmentally oriented citizens (green voters), whereas sticking to the terms of the
agreement may be rewarded by these voters support in future elections. In the second
case, in contrast, countries benet from observing that other cosigners fully carry out their
promises i.e., they infer a strong commitment with the fulllment of the environmental
standards included in the IEA and experience disutility from such lack of commitment
otherwise.
1Both assumptions can simultaneously be introduced in the model. However, this generalization reduces
the intuition of the results without improving its explanatory power.
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Di¤erent real life observations support the idea that countries may benet from the rel-
ative fulllment of the agreements in which they participate. First, regarding the positive
relationship between voters and countriesrelative fulllment of its commitments, there is
strong empirical evidence suggesting that voters do vote for an incumbent politician based
on her past performance (relative to her initial promises), what is referred as retrospective
voting.2 Moreover, in the specic relationship between green voters and countriesrelative
fulllment of the IEA, table 1 (appendix) shows the existence of a positive correlation be-
tween the proportion of green parties in a countrys parliament and that countrys relative
fulllment of the commitments it signed in the Kyoto protocol. Second, regarding countries
concern for each othersfulllment of the IEA, we can also nd many real cases, where for
instance, certain northern European countries such as Germany which essentially stick to
the terms of the Kyoto protocolmay feel some disappointment from observing that many
other signatories do not carry out their promises as they should.3
In order to examine the role of these non-binding IEAs in countriesenvironmental poli-
cies, this paper analyzes a two-stage complete information environmental game. Countries
rst decide the environmental goals to be included in the IEA (negotiation game), and given
these goals, they simultaneously choose how much to invest in emission-reducing technologies
during the second stage of the game (investment game). In particular, this study shows that
countries try to impose the most demanding environmental standards on other countries but
not on themselves during the negotiation stage of the game. Indeed, when countries are
concerned about either their own relative fulllment of the IEA or about other countries
relative fulllment, the specic commitment they sign in the treaty becomes relevant, even if
these commitments are non-enforceable by any international organization. These predictions
are conrmed by the e¤ort that countries exert trying to achieve that other countries sign
di¤erent non-binding international agreements, either on environmental issues or not.4 In
2For example, Francis et al. (1994) nd that representatives whose voting records are closer to the
predicted senatorial position for their state are more likely to enter a primary, which supports the hypothesis
that representatives expect primary voters to choose retrospectively.
3Existing evidence suggests that only 15 out of the 41 countries included in Table 3 (appendix) of the
Kyoto protocol have fullled their commitments in Article 3 (which species a 5 percent reduction in the
emission of greenhouse gases from 1990 to 2008).
4For instance, in February 2007 the European Union insisted that they would sign a reduction in emissions
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addition, the research identies how the commitments involved in the IEA a¤ect countries
investment in clean technologies in a second stage of the game, despite of the fact that these
commitments are non-binding. Specically, it determines under what parameter values (and
under what commitments signed during the negotiation stage) countriesreduction of pollu-
tants is higher than what standard environmental games predict. Finally, the paper explains
the case where a country would only accept an agreed level equal to zero (e.g., the case of
United Kingdom in the Helsinki protocol or U.S. in the Kyoto Protocol), however it invests
positive amounts in clean technologies in the investment game.
The contribution of this paper to the literature on environmental games is then twofold.
First, it endogenizes the particular commitments that countries include and sign in the IEA,
explaining also why countries care about the specic terms of the agreement despite these
terms being non-enforceable. In contrast, standard environmental games assume that coun-
tries simply decide whether to participate in the IEA, whose environmental goals coincide
with the Pareto-e¢ cient level (probably determined by scientists). This makes the specic
commitments included in the IEA exogenous to the game. Second, this paper explains the
interaction between the specic terms of an agreement and countriesrelative fulllment of
such agreement, which are considered to be completely independent in the existing litera-
ture. Interestingly, this model can be applied to many other settings, where players (either
countries, rms, or individuals) interact with other players signing a contract in which they
both engage in the provision of a certain public good. The contents of the contract are
observable, but cannot be enforced by a third party, such as a court of law. Specically, if
players are concerned about the relative fulllment of the contract by other players, or by
themselves, this model predicts higher contribution levels, and lower free-riding behaviors
than in standard public good games.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two comments on the game-theoretic literature
that studies IEAs. In particular, it focuses on those analyses predicting higher levels of
by 30 percent if other heavy pollutants (e.g. U.S., China and India) sign the agreement as well. Another
example is the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, passed by the U.S. Senate on July 25, 1997, which stated that the
United States should not be a signatory to any protocol that did not include binding targets and timetables
for developing as well as industrialized nations.
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emission reduction than in standard environmental games. Section three describes the model
under the assumption that countries are concerned about their own relative fulllment of
the agreement (e.g., because of the importance of green voters), and analyzes countriesbest
response functions in this setting. Afterwards, it examines countriesequilibrium strategies
in this simultaneous move game and analyzes the optimal proposals to be made by every
country during the (previous) negotiation stage of the IEA, given the above equilibrium
strategies. Section four describes the model under the assumption that countries care about
each othersrelative fulllment of the IEA and compares its results with those of the rst
model. Finally, the last section elaborates on the conclusions of the paper, as well as further
areas of research.
2.2 RELATED LITERATURE
Given the relatively pessimistic prediction of the existing literature examining environmental
improvement as a (global) public good, many di¤erent game-theoretic approaches have been
applied to explain why cooperation is sometimes observed in international environmental
policies. In the following subsection, I elaborate on the main results and assumptions of these
models grouped into four di¤erent branchesas well as their main criticisms. Additionally,
subsection 2.2 summarizes the debate on treaty compliance.
2.2.1 Literature on environmental games predicting cooperation
In recent years, di¤erent authors have used the theory of repeated games to rationalize
why certain international agreements are in fact respected along time, see Barrett (1994a,
1994b, 1999), Cesar (1994) and Rubio and Ulph (2007). In particular, a cooperative solution
can be supported as a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game when countries discount
factor is high enough. Despite their satisfactory results in terms of cooperation among
the players, the disadvantage of using repeated games to analyze such interactions among
countries implementing IEAs are, among others: (1) the restriction on the su¢ ciently high
values for the discount factor, which is di¢ cult to reconcile with myopic politicians, and (2)
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the multiplicity of equilibria supported as the Nash equilibrium of the repeated game, which
limits the predictive power of the model.
Similarly, another class of models considers countries preferences for international
equality, as in game-theoretic models analyzing social preferences with inequity adverse
agents, see Hoel and Schneider (1995). In this case, the equilibrium prediction also deter-
mines that countries fulll the agreement they sign in the IEA, at least to a greater extent
than in the standard models described above. That is, their reduction of pollutant emissions
is more relevant when countries have social preferences among other countries than when
they only have strictly individualistic preferences. Also, Jeppesen and Anderson (1998) de-
velop Barrets model (1994a) incorporating the idea of fairness introduced by Rabin (1993).
They show that if countries are highly concerned about the welfare of other countries, full
cooperation can be supported as an equilibrium. However, the assumption that countries
are actually concerned about the payo¤s that another country obtains from playing this
environmental game does not seem to be very realistic.
Another class of models explaining the seeming dissonance between the standard theo-
retical models analyzed above in which countries are predicted to have poor incentives to
reduce emissions and real cases in which certain countries carry out their promises in
the IEA to a great extent uses the possibility that an international organization imposes
sanctions on the defectingcountries, see Barrett (1992, 1994a).5 Obviously, introducing
the possibility of receiving a sanction induces every country to maintain its promises in the
IEA. However, these models have also been subject to criticism in the literature, since they
assume enforceable contracts. Given that most of these international agreements cannot be
enforced by any legal organization, this model is probably very restrictive in its assumptions.6
Finally, an interesting (and productive) branch of the literature examines the possibility
of linked negotiations on transboundary pollution with other issues such as free trade
5Note that Barret (1999) analyzes the theory of international cooperation in the context of repeated
games where players use contingent strategies, such as grim strategies.
6Schelling (2006) provides arguments about why there is no obvious formula to make the punishment t
the crime in IEAs.
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agreements, which developed countries may use to achieve greater reductions in pollution by
developing countries, see Whalley (1991) and Folmer et al (1993). Importantly, these models
predict a limitation of the free-riding practices when the countriesinterests are su¢ ciently
complementary. In spite of their interest, these models have also been criticized because
of: (1) the coercion they seem to recommend from developed nations to underdeveloped
ones in order to induce better environmental practices among the latter, and (2) because
of the di¢ culty to implement such limitations on real free-trade agreements, given the last
advances of the World Trade Organization.
In order to overcome some of the shortcomings of the existing literature, in this paper I
propose a model that limits countriesfree-riding practices in certain cases (while it allows
them under some parameter values) without the need to repeat the environmental game
during di¤erent periods and without relying on social preferences among the countries. In
addition, I do not need to allow the possibility of legal sanctions (or coercion in terms of
trade agreements) to be enforced by the countries or by any international organization.
These elements permit an easier analysis and complementary interpretations to the ones in
the above models.
2.2.2 Literature on treaty compliance
There is substantial debate in the literature about how countries achieve compliance in
international agreements. Chayes and Chayes (1995) argue that countries spend a lot of
energy and time in preparing, drafting, negotiating and monitoring treaty obligations, which
leads them to usually comply with their part of the treaty. Even though they recognize that
noncompliance exists, they justify it by ambiguity of the treaty, the capacity limitation of
status and uncontrollable social or economic changes. Moreover, they consider that sanctions
are not necessary to ensure compliance. On the other hand, Downs et al. (1996) defend the
idea that sanctions are an important element on treaty compliance. They argue that the
evidence suggests that high levels of compliance and infrequent use of enforcement result
from the low requirements of the agreement. Barret (1999) attempts to disentangle the
debate. He concludes that the main constraint on international cooperation is free-riding
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deterrence, not compliance enforcement. This paper recognizes the fact that noncompliance
plays an important role in the IEA, however the extreme case of complete violation of a
treaty obligation is not observed in the equilibrium. Additionally, the absence of the full
cooperative outcome in the results can mainly be explained by free-riding as in Barret (1999).
2.3 MODEL WHEN COUNTRIES CARE ABOUT THEIR OWN
FULFILLMENT
Consider a two-stage complete information game. In the rst stage of the game, the ne-
gotiation stage, countries decide the terms of the environmental agreement. In the second
stage, the investment game, countries privately decide how much investment to make on
emission-reducing technologies. Each country is endowed with w monetary units (e.g. gov-
ernmental budget). Let xi denote country is monetary investments in clean technologies
(alternatively in reduction of pollutant emissions), and let zi represent its consumption of
private goods. These private goods can be interpreted, generally, as the tax revenue raised
by the government, which can now be kept for alternative uses in other expenditure pro-
grams not related with the IEA. Additionally, the marginal utility country i derives from
alternative expenditure programs (private good) is one.
In particular, I assume that the di¤erence between country is actual investment in
cleaner technologies, xi, and the commitment level of investment that country i specied in
the treaty, ci  07 (which is endogenously determined in the rst stage of the game, section
3.3), represents the relative fulllment of country is commitment in the agreement. This
di¤erence can also be understood as the noncompliance cost. That is,
fi = i (xi   ci) (2.1)
First, note that country i improves its opinion among green voters if its investment in
cleaner technologies, xi, is higher or equal than its commitment level, ci; otherwise, if country
7Zero represents the case in which country i does not sign the agreement.
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i invests less than what it was supposed to, xi < ci, green voters of country i perceive a lack
of commitment to the agreement, which could lead them to penalize the incumbent party
in future elections.8 In addition, this di¤erence is scaled by i 2 [0;+1[. In short, i9
indicates the importance of green voters in country i. For instance, i can be interpreted as
the percentage of politicians from green parties in the Senate or the percentage of population
who belongs to environmental organizations. The higher is this percentage, the more negative
is the impact of a lack of fulllment of the agreement in the governmentsutility. Finally,
in further sections I consider an extension of this model, where countries are assumed to be
concerned about each othersrelative fulllment of the IEA (instead of its own fulllment).
Specically, country is utility function is represented by a quasilinear utility function,
where private goods (money) enter linearly, while both total investments in clean technologies
by country i and j, G = xi+ xj, and country is relative fulllment of the terms in the IEA,
fi, are included in the nonlinear function v ().
Ui (zi; G; fi) = zi + v(G; fi) (2.2)
For simplicity, assume the nonlinear (concave) function v(G; fi) = ln [mG+ fi]10. There-
fore, the representative countrys maximization problem is given by
max
xi
Ui (zi; G; fi) = zi + ln [mG+ i (xi   ci)] (2.3)
subject to zi + xi = w
xi + xj = G
xi > 0
8This study assumes that green voters care about the total investment in clean technologies, G, and the
compliance of their countriesagreement, fi, but not about the commitment level signed in the IEA, ci, since
that level is not relevant per se in terms of achieving the objectives of the IEA.
9Note that this parameter can have di¤erent interpretations. For instance, in this model, it is understood
as the countries concern about their green voters penalization. However, it can also be interpreted as
countries individualistic concerns about their self-image or moral motivations. Nyborg (2000) and Brekke et
al. (2003) have developed interesting studies about moral motivation in public good games.
10The ln() function in country is utility must be strictly positive, i.e. mG+ i (xi   ci) > 0.
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Using zi = w  xi, and for a given value of xj > 0 we can simplify the above program to
max
xi
w   xi + ln [m(xi + xj) + i (xi   ci)] (2.4)
xi > 0
In particular, the rst term, w  xi, represents the utility derived from the consumption
of the remaining monetary units that have not been invested in clean technologies, i.e., that
have not been invested in the public good. In the second term, m represents the return from
the environmental good and m(xi+xj) denotes the total return that country i obtains from
the consumption of a higher level of environmental quality given its own investments, xi, and
the ones of country j, xj. Finally, i (xi   ci) represents the return that country i derives
from relatively fullling its commitment ci in the environmental agreement or the cost that
it incurs from the noncompliance of its agreements. Intuitively, an increase in country is
investment, xi, has a traditional public good dimension, via m(xi + xj), and an additional
fulllment dimension, via i (xi   ci).
2.3.1 Best response function
In order to gain a clearer intuition of the results, this subsection introduces country is best
response function, and the next section analyzes the optimal investment level. Henceforth,
all proofs are included in the appendix.
Lemma 1
In the investment game with concerns about green voters, country is best response func-
tion, xi(xj), is
xi(xj) =
8<: 1 + 1m+i [ici  mxj] if xj 2 [0;
i(1+ci)+m
m
[
0 if xj > i(1+ci)+mm
Let us compare the best response function xi(xj) of a country which assigns a positive
importance to the noncompliance cost, i > 0, to that of a country which is not concerned
about it, xNCi (xj), as in standard environmental models. In particular, when country i
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assigns no importance to the population who cares about the relative fulllment of IEA,
i = 0, country is best response function becomes
xNCi (xj) =
8<: 1  xj if xj 2 [0; 1[0 if xj > 1 (2.5)
This expression is represented in gure 1, which helps in the comparison of the reaction
functions. Specically, note that xi(xj) is always above xNCi (xj) for any xj.
11 In other words,
country i will always have higher levels of investment in emission-reducing technologies when
it is concerned about green voterspunishment than otherwise, for any investments of country
j, xj.
xi
xj
1
im
m
a+
m
cii )1(1 ++ a
xi(xj)
1
xNCi(xj)
i
ii
m
c
a
a
+
+1
Figure 1: Model 1. Comparison Between BRFs
2.3.2 Non-cooperative equilibrium investments
In this section I examine the equilibrium strategies in the simultaneous Nash equilibrium
resulting from both countries i and j applying lemma 1. The following proposition states
the main result, and below I elaborate on its intuition and comparative statics.
11Note that 1 + i(1+ci)m > 1 for any parameter values, and any ci  0.
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Proposition 1
In the investment game, every country is Nash equilibrium investment in emission-
reducing technologies is
xi =
8>>><>>>:
1 + ici
m+i
if i > i(j)
i(1+ci)(j+m) jmcj
jm+i(j+m)
if i 2]^i(j); i(j)]
0 if i 2]0; ^i(j)]
where i(j) =
jcjm
(1+ci)(j+m)
and ^i(j) =
mcj+j(1+cj)(m+cj)
(1+ci)m
In particular, country is investment in clean technologies is at its maximum level when
its concern about green voters, i, is su¢ ciently high, i.e., i > i(j). When the importance
that country i assigns to green voters, i, decreases below i(j), its optimal investment also
decreases, as the above proposition shows. That is, country i is not highly concerned about
its own relative fulllment of the IEA because it does not perceive the group of green voters
as being relevant in future elections. Finally, if i drops below the threshold ^i(j), then
its concerns about green voterspunishment are not strong enough to support any positive
investment in clean technologies from country i. Hence, from proposition 1 we can conclude
that the full free-riding outcome is not a solution of this game when the weight that the
country assigns to green voters is above a particular threshold, as the following corollary
species.
Corollary 1
In the investment game, every country is Nash equilibrium investment in emission-
reducing technologies, xi , is strictly positive, if and only if i > ^i(j).
Additionally, the following lemma indicates under what parameter values we can expect
countriesaggregate investment in clean technologies to be higher than their investment when
countries are not concerned about their own relative fulllment of the IEA.
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Lemma 2
In the investment game, when one of the countries is su¢ ciently concerned about green
voterspunishment, i.e., i > ^i(j) or j > ^j(i), the aggregate Nash equilibrium invest-
ment in emission-reducing technologies , G, is greater than one for any parameter values.
Thus, as long as at least one of the countries is su¢ ciently concerned about the noncom-
pliance cost, i.e., i > ^i(j) or j > ^j(i), the total optimal investment in the simultaneous
environmental game, G = xi + x

j , is higher than the total investment obtained in standard
environmental games in which countries do not assign any weight to the relative fulllment
of the IEA. Let us now examine how country is optimal investment in clean technologies
changes in the di¤erent parameters of the model. The following lemma summarizes these
comparative statics about xi , while the discussion below elaborates on its intuition.
Lemma 3
In the environmental game of investment in emission-reducing technologies, country is
equilibrium investment level, xi , is weakly increasing (decreasing) in ci ( cj), for any para-
meter values.
Hence, country is equilibrium investment, xi , is increasing in the (non-enforceable) own
commitment, ci, that country i accepts when signing the IEA. The increase in xi is due
to country is own obligation to fulll the contract, given that its lack of fulllment can
be punished by voters with strong environmental concerns. Interestingly, an increase in
country js commitment of investment in the IEA, i.e., an increase in cj, reduces country is
optimal investment in clean technologies, xi . This result can be explained by the fact that
a higher commitment of country j in the IEA relaxescountry is incentives to invest in
clean technologies. Let us now examine how xi varies in country i and js concerns about
green voters.
Lemma 4
In the environmental game of investment in emission-reducing technologies, country is
equilibrium investment level, xi , is weakly increasing (decreasing) in i (j).
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First, note that country is Nash equilibrium level of investment, xi , is increasing in its
own concern about green voters, i. Thus, if green voters represent an important proportion
of the population who can a¤ect the future elections results, then country i will invest higher
levels of xi in order to fulll its commitment, ci. On the other hand, country i decreases its
investment, xi, if the importance of green voters in other countries, j, increases. Clearly,
country i knows that an increase in j induces country j to achieve a greater fulllment of
its own commitments, increasing xj, what ultimately reduces country is investment since
country is best response function is negatively sloped.
2.3.3 Equilibrium proposals
The previous section analyzed the optimal investment levels of each country, given a specic
commitment of investing in clean technologies specied in the IEA for every country, ci
and cj. This section goes one step back and, using sequential rationality, examines the
optimal investment levels that every country accepts for itself and the other country the
pair (ci; cj)in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game describing the
negotiation and posterior implementation of the IEA. The following proposition species
countriesincentives in this negotiation stage of the game, and below I discuss the SPNE
strategies of the signatory countries in the IEAs.
Proposition 2
Every country is equilibrium payo¤ from playing the investment game, with the optimal
investments
 
xi ; x

j

determined in proposition 1, is weakly decreasing (increasing) in ci ( cj).
Hence, in the negotiation stage of the game where countries determine the investment
levels (ci; cj) to be included in the text of the IEAevery country i has incentives to set low
environmental standards for itself (low ci), but high requirements for other countries (high
cj). This result has important consequences in the optimal proposals of the pair (ci; cj) to
be voted during the negotiation stage under any voting procedure, since countries want to
shift the greatest burden of the IEA to other countries.
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The determination of the commitment levels that each country signs in the agreement
could be obtained through the Nash bargaining solution concept. However, it cannot be
applied in the model because the models payo¤ structure is not well-behaved.
Therefore, the negotiation stage is represented by a one-shot game in which country i
proposes a pair of commitment levels (ci; cj) and country j is allowed to either accept or
reject such proposal. This game is known in the game theory literature as the ultimatum
bargaining game. In particular, the following proposition analyzes the SPNE strategies
resulting from a fairly simple voting procedure.
Proposition 3
If the voting procedure is represented by the ultimatum bargaining game, the equilibrium
investment level for every country i is,
First case: if i > i(j) and j 2]0,^j(i)]
(ci ; c

j)=(
i( 1+m+i)
1+i
;
ew(3i e
wm+mB+i(1+m)B+
2
i ( 1+ewm2)
j(1+i)(m+i)
)
(xi ; x

j)=(
m+i(1+m+i(m+i))
(1+i)(m+i)
; 0)
Second case: if i 2]^i(j); i(j)] and j 2]^j(i); j(i)]
ci2[0;i( 1+w)+m( 1+2w)+	 log	+m log  )i ] and
cj2[ ij+jm( 1+w)+i w+(jm+i ) log  j	 ;
j( 1+w)+m( 1+2w)+  log  +m log	)
j
]
xi2[	 mw m log  	 ; w + log	] and xj2 [j(2	 mw m log  )jm+i  ; w + log  ]
Third case: if i 2]0; ^i(j)] and j > j(i)
ci2[0; e
 w( 1+ewmw+ewm log[j+m])
i
] and cj=
(m+j)( 1+w+log[j+m])
j
xi = 0 and x

j2 [1; w + log[j +m])
Notice that country i exerts all its proposing power, since country j accepts any pro-
posal leading to zero payo¤s. Moreover, the negotiation process can be represented by three
di¤erent cases which depend on the concern levels of the proposing country and the country
receiving the o¤er. Therefore, the agreed commitment levels vary in each case, for instance,
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they depend in what the concern level of the rst mover is (which has all the bargaining
power) and how important the noncompliance cost is for the country which accept or reject
such o¤er. Additionally, in the event of a rejection from country j, the total commitment
levels are equal to zero and both countries get a zero payo¤. In other words, if the envi-
ronmental agreement is not signed countries will not benet from the environmental quality
than they could have achieved otherwise.
Of course, in more elaborated settings, such as the voting procedures developed in di¤er-
ent international organizations, country i cannot take full advantage of its proposing power.
Instead, it may propose less extreme investment pairs (ci; cj), since the possibility of playing
some cooperative-punishment strategy in this repeated game might induce higher payo¤s for
country i. In spite of other considerations, the model that this paper analyzes can clearly
capture countriesincentives during the negotiation of the IEA, which emphasizes countries
e¤orts in shifting the greatest possible burden of the (non-binding) commitments included in
the IEA to other countries. Moreover, proposition 3 suggests that even in the extreme case
where country is commitment level is zero (it can be interpreted as not signing the treaty),
it will still invest in clean technologies as long as country i is concerned enough about green
voters.12
Corollary 2
In the rst case of the negotiation stage of the environmental game where country i
proposes a pair (0; e
w( 1+ewm)
j
) and country is concern level is i  1   m, country is
optimal investment in clean technologies is strictly positive.
Hence, the extreme situation where country i exerts all its bargaining power in the nego-
12Note the connection of these results with those in the literature on strategic pre-commitment, as in
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Balboa et al. (2004). Indeed, in this literature players choose the level of
an irreversible variable, such as physical capital or tax, during the rst stage with the objective to inuence
the strategic environment of the game played during the second stage. Similarly, in this model every country
i uses the negotiation stage of the IEA to reduce its own commitment level (since this reduces its non-
compliance costs in the second stage), and increases the other countrys commitment level (given that this
leads the other country to invest more in clean technologies during the second stage). In summary, every
country uses the negotiation stage in order to shift most of the burden of the public good provision to the
other country in the second stage.
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tiation stage (zero commitment level) is compensated in the investment game. Since, when
country is concern level is strictly positive it invests positive amounts in clean technolo-
gies. Finally, notice that when the utility from the total investment in clean technology, m,
increases, then country i proposes a less extreme pair of commitment levels, i.e. ci > 0.
Corollary 3
In the negotiation stage of the environmental game where country i proposes a pair (ci ; c

j)
and country i is very (relatively) concerned about the noncompliance cost and country j is
not (relatively) concerned, cj is increasing in i.
The above corollary represents country is interest in imposing high commitment levels on
country j. If the proposer su¤ers a high political cost when it does not fulll its environmental
agreements, then it has incentives in o¤ering a positive cj (even though the responder does
not comply its agreement in the second stage of the game).
Corollary 4
In the negotiation stage of the environmental game where country i proposes a pair (ci; cj)
and country i and j are relatively concerned about the noncompliance cost , G is increasing
in i and j.
In other words, when signatory countries are concerned about the noncompliance cost,
the total investment in clean technology obtained in the investment game increases. That
is, if countries which participate in the negotiation of the IEA have high political costs, in
terms of noncompliance of their environmental agreements, it positively a¤ect the results of
the treaty.
Finally, gure 14 in the appendix depicts the relationship between country i and js
concern levels. Specically, region 2 shows that every country tries to impose the most
demanding environmental standard on the other country but not on themselves during the
negotiation stage. Notice that country i could propose zero commitment level for itself
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(avoiding any political cost), however this is not the case when its concern level lies in region
2. Specically, country i and j sign positive commitment levels which can be explained
by the traditional public good dimension. In fact this result reects the trade o¤ between
countriespolitical cost and the total return from the total investment in clean technology.
2.4 A MODEL WHEN COUNTRIES CARE ABOUT EACH OTHERS
FULFILLMENT
Let us now consider the model presented in section 3, but assuming that country is concerns
about the relative fulllment of the IEA depends on the extent to which country j fullls
its commitment in the agreement, cj > 0. That is, country is maximization problem is now
dened as
max
xi
w   xi + ln [m(xi + xj) + i (xj   cj)] (2.6)
where country i improves his perception of country js serious commitment of carrying out
the treaty if country js investment in cleaner technologies, xj, is higher than or equal to
his commitment level, cj; otherwise, if country j invests less than what it was supposed
to, xj < cj, country i perceives a lack of commitment in the fulllment of the agreement,
which leads to a negative perception from country js actions. Additionally, i indicates
the importance that country i assigns to country js fulllment of its part of the agreement,
where as before i 2 [0;+1[.
Intuitively, note that in this model an increase in country js investment, xj, imposes
both a positive direct and indirect e¤ect on country is utility level. The positive direct
e¤ect from xj on country is utility is just the usual one arising from the public good na-
ture of country js investment on emission-reducing technologies. Country js investments,
additionally, impose a positive indirect e¤ect on country i since these investments increase
the relative commitment that country i perceives from country js actions, i.e., higher xj
increases i (xj   cj), for any given commitment level cj. The following lemma describes
country is best response function in this context.
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Lemma 5
In the simultaneous environmental game of investment in emission-reducing technologies
with concerns about the each others fulllment of the international agreement, country is
best response function, xi(xj), is
xi(xj) =
8<: 1m [icj +m  (i +m)xj] if xj 2 [0;
icj+m
i+m
[
0 if xj > icj+mi+m
A comparison between the best response function xi(xj) of a country concerned about
other countrys fulllment of the agreement, i > 0, with respect to that of a country which
is not concerned about the other countrys commitment with the treaty, xNCi (xj) will give
us more intuition about the countriesstrategic behavior.
xi
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Figure 2: Model 2. Comparison betwee BRFs
Figure 2 shows that xi(xj) is steeper than xNCi (xj) for any xj. In particular, xi(xj) is
above xNCi (xj) for any xj < cj, and below otherwise. In other words, country i compen-
sates country js investments when it is below its countrys commitment in the IEA, cj.
Specically, note that when country js actual investment in emission-reducing technologies
is lower than the level it signed in the IEA, xj < cj, country i experiences a disutility from
the lack of commitment it interprets from country js actions. Hence, in order to compen-
sate for such low level of investment country i invests more than it would in the case of not
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being concerned about the fulllment of the contract. In contrast, when xj > cj, country i
experiences an increase in its utility level given the strong commitment with the IEA from
country j. In this case, country i makes an optimal investment in clean technologies below
that it would carry out when not being concerned about the performance of the contract.
Let us now examine the equilibrium strategies in the simultaneous Nash equilibrium re-
sulting from both countries i and j applying the above best response function. The following
proposition states the main result, and below I elaborate on its intuition.
Proposition 4
In the negotiation game, every country is Nash equilibrium investment in emission-
reducing technologies is
xi =
8>>><>>>:
icj+m
m;
if i > i(j)
jcim+i(jci+m cjm)
jm+i(j+m)
if i 2]^i(j); i(j)]
0 if i 2]0; ^i(j)]
where i(j) =
j(ci m)+m m2
cj(j+m)
and ^i(j) =
jcim
m(cj 1) jci
In particular, country is investment in clean technologies is at its maximum level when
country is concerns about other countries fulllment of the agreement, i, is su¢ ciently
high, i.e., when i > i(j). However, if the importance that country i assigns to country
js commitment with the contract, i, decreases below i(j), its optimal investment also
decreases, as the above proposition shows. Finally, when i drops below the threshold ^i(j),
then its concerns about country j honoring the IEA are not strong enough to support any
positive investment in clean technologies from country i. Let us now analyze under what
parameter values the aggregate investments in clean technologies are above those in standard
environmental games.
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Lemma 6
In the negotiation game, the aggregate Nash equilibrium investment in emission-reducing
technologies, G, is greater than one if and only if either i > i(j) or j > j(i).
Additionally, when neither i > i(j) nor j > j(i) are satised, G is greater than one
if and only if ci + cj > 1.
As in the previous model, the total optimal investment in the simultaneous environmental
game, G = xi +x

j , is greater than one when at least one of the countries is highly concerned
about each others relative fulllment, i.e., i > i(j) or j > j(i). However, when
both countries are not highly concerned about each others fulllment, total investments
are only higher than those in standard environmental games when the total environmental
goals specied in the IEA are relatively demanding, i.e., when ci + cj > 1. Regarding
the comparative statics of the Nash equilibrium investment levels, xi , the following lemma
conrms that we can extend our intuitions from the previous section.
Lemma 7
In the negotiation stage in which countries are concerned about each others relative
fulllment of the IEA, both corollary 1 and lemma 3 hold.
Hence, in this setting lemma 3 can be interpreted as follows. Country is equilibrium
investment, xi , is increasing in the (non-enforceable) own commitment, ci, that it accepts
when signing the IEA. Interestingly, the increase in xi is not due to country is own obligation
to fulll the contract (as in previous sections), but instead, because a higher commitment of
country i in the IEA relaxescountry js incentives to invest in clean technologies. Indeed,
since now country i is supposed to invest more (higher ci), country j invests less (lower xj),
which ultimately leads country i to increase its investment to compensate country js lack
of investment in emission-reducing technologies. Similarly, an increase in country js agreed
level of investment in the IEA i.e., an increase in cj, as in the second result of the above
lemmareduces country is optimal investment in clean technologies, xi . In the following
lemma I examine how xi varies in country i and js concerns about each othersfulllment
of the environmental agreement.
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Lemma 8
In the environmental game of investment in emission-reducing technologies, country is
equilibrium investment level, xi , is weakly decreasing (increasing) in i (j), if and only if
cj > 1  ci.
First, note that country is Nash equilibrium level of investment, xi , is decreasing in
its own concern about country js fulllment of the contracts requirements, i, if and only
if cj > 1   ci. This result is opposed to that we obtained in lemma 4. In particular,
it species that if the commitment of investment in emission-reducing technologies that
country j signs in the IEA is su¢ ciently high, then country i perceives its investment as less
necessary, similarly to the above discussion about the e¤ects of an increase in cj. Otherwise,
if cj < 1  ci, then country i increases its investment as i increases, since it considers that
country i must compensate country js lack of investment in clean technologies.
An alternative interpretation of this result would focus on how demanding are the
environmental goals included in the IEA.When the investment objectives specied in the IEA
are extremely demanding, i.e., ci + cj > 1, then country is optimal investment in emission-
reducing technologies decreases in their own concern, i, about country js fulllment of the
contract. In contrast, international agreements with conservative goals, ci + cj < 1, make
country is investment in clean technologies to be increasing in i.13
Let us nally analyze what happens with country is optimal investment, xi , when the
importance that country j assigns to country is fulllment of the contract requirements, j,
increases. In particular, an increase in j raises country is equilibrium investment, xi , if
and only if cj > 1   ci. Clearly, now if country j assigns a greater importance to country
is fulllment of the contract and the investment level that country i specied in the IEA is
13This interpretation is related to the results obtained by Barrett (1994a) and Downs et. al. (1996).
When the agreement establishes low requirements (or gains to cooperate are small) free riding behavior is
less preeminent. Therefore, a highly concerned country will exert higher e¤orts to achieve the compliance of
the agreement.
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relatively high (i.e., cj > 1   ci is equivalent to 1   cj < ci) leads country j to reduce xj,
increasing xi as a consequence.
Similarly to the previous intuition, if we interpret these results in terms of how demanding
are the goals of the IEA, one can conclude that when the IEA is very demanding (conserv-
ative) country is investments in emission-reducing technologies are increasing (decreasing)
in the importance that other countries assign to country is fulllment of the contract, j.
Finally, we can briey analyze the negotiation stage of the IEA given the above optimal
investment levels for every country.
Proposition 5
Every country is equilibrium payo¤ from playing the investment game, with the optimal
investments
 
xi ; x

j

determined in proposition 3, is weakly decreasing (increasing) in ci ( cj).
The above proposition is indeed equivalent to proposition 2, and in this context it em-
phasizes countries incentives to shift most of the burden of the IEA to other countries,
trying to make certain that the IEA species high commitment levels for other countries,
cj, and low for themselves, ci. Finally, the following proposition denes the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the game under the assumption that countries are concerned about each
othersrelative fulllment of the IEA.
Proposition 6
If the voting procedure is represented by the ultimatum bargaining game, the equilibrium
investment level for every country i is,
First case: if i > i(j) and j 2]0; ^j(i)]
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
j)=(
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i)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Second case: if i 2]^i(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i)]
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2.4.1 Discussion and Applications
2.4.2 Discussion on countriesasymmetric fulllment of IEAs
Both of the models presented in this paper clearly predict that countries invest (weakly)
higher levels in emission-reducing technologies than in standard environmental games. In-
terestingly, in the rst model, the increase in countrys investment is due to its concern
about its own relative fulllment of the IEA, whereas in the second model this increase is
due to the countrys concern about other countriesrelatively fulllment of the agreement.
Notwithstanding their di¤erences, their similar predictions can explain why certain coun-
tries fulll to a great extent the commitments they acquire when signing IEAs, even if these
commitments are relatively informal and not perfectly enforceable.
Additionally, both models predict that a countrys optimal investment decision, xi, in-
creases in the countrys own commitment level, ci, and decreases in other countriescommit-
ments, cj. This result indicates that both countries relaxtheir optimal investments when
other countriescommitments in the IEA increase, this can rationalize why di¤erent coun-
tries condition their investment decisions on other cosignersparticular commitments in the
IEA, despite knowing that such commitments are non-binding and may not be implemented
by the cosigners of the treaty.
Finally, note that the main di¤erence between the results of both models is on the
comparative statics of countriesequilibrium investment, xi , with respect to i and j. In
the case that countries are concerned about their own relative fulllment of the agreement,
their equilibrium investments are clearly increasing in the importance that they assign to
their own fulllment of the IEA, i, and decreasing in the weight that the other country
assigns, j. In contrast, when countries are concerned about each othersrelative fulllment
of the environmental agreement, their equilibrium investments move in opposite directions:
decreasing in the importance every country assigns to other countries fulllment of the IEA,
i , and increasing in the weight that other countries assign, j, if and only if the agreement
is extremely demanding.
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The last result may explain the perspective on compliance of Downs et al. (1996), (see
section 2.2). They argue that when countries sign low commitments levels in the IEA, it is
very likely to observe that signatories fulll their compromises. Hence, in this model, low
agreed levels will induce countries which are concerned about others countries fulllment
to comply its commitment levels. The ndings rationalize why countries prefer to adopt
agreements that state feasible and realistic commitment levels.
2.4.3 Applications to international environmental negotiations
Regarding the negotiation stage, I rst show that countriesequilibrium payo¤ from playing
the investment game is weakly increasing in cj and decreasing in ci, for both models developed
in this paper. Hence, regardless of the voting procedure which nally decides which levels of
ci and cj are included in the IEA, countries clearly prefer to shift most of the commitments
of investment in clean technologies to other countries. Additionally, in the particular case in
which the voting procedure is similar to the ultimatum bargaining game, I show that country
i uses its proposer power to reduce ci (and increase cj) as much as possible. Ex ante, this
could make us conclude that countries are leading their negotiations towards a situation in
which they all want to free-ride each others e¤orts in emission-reducing technologies, without
bearing any costs. However, this is not the case, as previous sections show. Specically, every
countrys optimal investment in clean technologies is strictly higher than zero (both when
countries are concerned enough about green voterspunishment and when they are concerned
about each others fulllment), and increases in certain parameters. In particular, this is
true for the country which proposed the investment pair (ci; cj) specied in the international
agreement, as well as for the country which accepted such proposal.
Hence, the behavior initially predicted for the voting stage which one could describe as
free-riding of the country with the greatest bargaining poweris then compensated by the
second stage of the game, where countries decide how much to invest in emission-reducing
technologies, since no country decides to operate as a pure free-rider given their mutual
concerns about the fullling of the IEA, i; j > 0, as opposed to the prediction of the
model when countries do not assign any importance to such fulllment of the agreement,
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i = j = 0. The negotiation process can rationalize some cases that are observed in current
IEAs. For instance, it reects the EU interest in requiring the participation of India or China
in the Kyoto protocol. In particular, the EU is willing to increase its commitment level (30%
reduction in emissions) if and only if countries which are considered heavy pollutants sign
the agreement. Finally, the results can explain the United Statescase in the Kyoto protocol,
where in terms of the model, U.S. commitment level is zero (U.S. did not ratify the protocol
in the Senate). However, any positive investment in clean technologies would be interpreted
by U.S. concerns about green voters.
These results can shed some light on some relatively surprising real-life cases of IEAs,
where di¤erent countries rst need long periods of time in order to reach an agreement
about how much each country will reduce its emission of pollutants (or alternatively, how
much resources to invest in clean technologies). In particular, countries usually want to
impose important quotas on other countries (high values of cj), but at the same time are
reluctant to determine high quotas for themselves, ci. If these international agreements were
perfectly enforceable, countries would have a strong incentive to ght for a favorable division
of environmental quotas. These agreements are, however, clearly not perfectly enforceable,
what limits the possibility of rationalizing such lengthy negotiations from the perspective of
perfectly enforceable quotas.
Indeed, this model predicts that countries ght for such favorable quotas not because they
do not want to implement high investments in clean technology which is then beneted by
other countries given its public good nature. Instead, this model predicts such negotiations
because, even if the investment pair (ci; cj) included in the IEA is not enforceable, it enters
as a reference point14 in the countriesutility function. In particular, as previous sections
show, country is optimal investment decreases in cj (and increases in ci). However, since
these investments are costly, countries want to specify the contents of the IEA such that
it sets high environmental standards for other countries (high cj) and low requirements for
themselves (low ci).
14A deeper analysis of the e¤ect of reference points on players strategic incentives in sequential move
games can be found in Espinola-Arredondo and Munoz-Garcia (2007).
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2.5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes a two-stage game where countries, rst, decide the pair of investment
levels (ci; cj) in emission-reducing technologies to be included in an international environ-
mental agreement with no enforcing possibilities. Then, in the second stage, every country
independently and non-cooperatively determines how much to invest in this technology, given
its character of public good, and given the countrys concern about the relative fulllment
of the international agreement, either by itself or by other countries.
The study shows that, rst, every countrys investment level in clean technology is
nonzero for most parameter values, unlike those models analyzing environmental games
in which players (countries) are not concerned about the relative fulllment of the contracts
requirements. In addition, it examines how optimal investments vary in di¤erent parame-
ters. For instance, the countrys equilibrium investment in clean technologies can actually
increase in the importance (or political representation) of green voters. Similarly, this paper
also shows that these investments increase in the countrys concerns about other countries
relative fulllment of the IEA if, in addition, this IEA sets relatively low emission reduction
goals. In contrast, if the IEA sets high goals, it shows that a countrys investment in clean
technologies decrease in the countrys concerns about other countriesrelative fulllment of
the IEA. This result supports many real-life observations, in which countries prefer to specify
low goals (instead of unrealistic levels) of environmental improvement to be included in the
IEA. Finally, the study considers how countriesinvestment varies in the commitment that
every country acquires in the IEA, discussing why this result does not necessarily depend on
the agreement (since it is non-enforceable), but instead on the countriesown incentives in
the environmental game.
A crucial element in this model is the negotiation stage of the game, where countries
decide the investment levels to be included in the IEA. This paper analyzes the case when
the voting procedure resembles that in an ultimatum bargaining game, that is, countrys
optimal promises prescribe that all the (non-enforceable) investment in clean technologies is
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carried out by other countries, leaving no investment burden for itself. The results suggest
that, in spite of that these commitment levels are non-enforceable, some countries invest
positive amounts in environmentally oriented technology, even those countries who suggest
the radical proposal (ci ; c

j) = (0; cj) during the voting stage of the game. The ndings
predict that is more likely that an agreement will be forthcoming if the participating coun-
tries are relatively concerned about the noncompliance cost. Additionally, increases in the
advertising of countriesfulllment of their environmental agreements by organizations such
as the United Nations would raise countriesconcern level.
Finally, many results of this model permits a more general rationalization of real-life
practices during (and after) negotiations of IEAs. First, they support lengthy discussions
during the approval stage of IEA in which every country wants to get a favorable division of
the proposed investments in clean technologies that the agreement species, even when the
IEA is clearly non-enforceable. Second, they explain why di¤erent countries do fulll the
commitment they acquired when signing an IEA, while others do not; and how this strategy
depends on certain parameter values, such as how demanding is the international agreement,
or the international orientation of these countriesmedia services.
Di¤erent extensions would clearly enrich the analysis of this general model. First, the
paper develops a two stage complete information game. However, it would be interesting to
analyze the case in which each country has private information about its concern level, i.
Hence, in this setting country i can send a message about how much it cares about green
voters or other countriesfulllment of the agreement through its commitment level in the
IEA, ci. Second, countriesutility (or disutility) only comes from own or other countries
fulllment of the contracts requirements, while they do not consider, for example, their
own bad international imagefrom not fullling the terms of the IEA, which also could be
included in a more general model. Moreover, it would be interesting to study the case where
voters are represented by a di¤erent utility than that of the government. Finally, I assumed
that all countries obtained the same utility from the global environmental quality, however a
relaxation of this assumption allows us to analyze the role of this variable in the negotiation
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game, enriching the previous analysis. Further research in this area would enhance and clarify
our understanding of countriesincentives in the negotiation and (partial) implementation
of international agreements involving global public goods.
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3.0 GREEN AUCTIONS: A BIODIVERSITY STUDY OF MECHANISM
DESIGN WITH EXTERNALITIES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Many governments face the problem of how to procure the implementation of a project
considering the externalities that it produces in its surroundings. For instance, when the
government procures the construction of a bridge, it has to consider the cost of this project
and the bridges characteristics but also the externalities that it will produce in all the com-
munity that will use it. These considerations about externalities are especially present when
the government wants to develop a conservation program that increases the level of biodi-
versity of some particular territory. In particular, this situation exists when the government
does not develop the environmental project by itself, but assigns its implementation to the
landholders.
The paper assumes that landholders dedicate their land to market activities before the
project is implemented. As a consequence, the only tool that the government can use to
induce landholdersparticipation in the conservation program is through a monetary com-
pensation. Therefore, the government has to achieve a balance between the costs of im-
plementing the project and the biodiversity that it generates. A relevant characteristic in
this kind of situation is related with the fact that the landholder has more information
than the government about his costs and the resources needed to implement a biodiversity
project in his land. Hence, we are dealing with information asymmetry, which can provoke
opportunistic behavior from the landholder. For example, he can hide information about
his real costs or about the land use intensities. As a result, the government could be over-
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compensating this opportunistic landholder. In this respect, auctions reduce the scope for
opportunistic behavior resulting from informational asymmetries between the seller and the
bidders. Specically, in this type of procurement auctions the government announces a con-
tract for the assignment of a biodiversity project in a specied area and calls for bids from
potential bidders (landholders).
The government is not only interested in improving the biodiversity, however, but it
also has to optimize the monetary resources coming from all society, as noted above. This
implies that the landholder submits a multidimensional message in this mechanism, which is
composed of the cost of the project and a non-monetary variable that represents the biodi-
versity improvement that the project will generate. In this sense, one of the main objectives
of this paper is to construct an optimal mechanism that maximizes the governments ob-
jective function and induces landholders to participate in the conservation program. Once
this optimal mechanism is found, it can easily be transformed into a procurement auction
by appropriately applying the optimal allocation and payment rule.
Some examples of procurement auctions used to protect the biodiversity of a specic
region are found in the United States and Australia. In the case of the United States, the
Department of Agriculture has implemented auctions in which the landholders bid for pay-
ments for retiring their lands from farm production for a period of 10 to 15 years. In Victoria
(Australia) the government has developed an auction of conservation programs where the
landholders bid for payments they can receive for undertaking conservation activities.
Additionally, the conservation program described above also needs to consider the ex-
istence of externalities1 derived from the project. I assume that the landholder producing
biodiversity generates externalities for those neighboring landholders who decide not to par-
ticipate. An important assumption in this study is that the environmental improvement
understood as an increase in the biodiversity level in the landcauses a positive (negative)
externality in some specic area. Furthermore, this externality leads to a reduction (increase)
1An externality exists whenever the welfare of some agent, landholder in this model, depends on activities
under the control of some other agent.
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in the cost of all the landholders who do not produce biodiversity and keep using their land in
the same activities as before the conservation program. Since these activities were supposed
to have only market concerns I refer to these activities carried out by landholders before the
procurement auction as market activities.
For simplicity, I design a mechanism that introduces the externalities generated by an
environmental project into the cost function of every nonparticipant landholder. The rst
part of the paper is focused on determining the consequences of having only a negative
externality in the design of the mechanism. An example of negative externality can be
found in the procurement of a project to increase the species of oaks. Let us consider two
landholders, one of them producing honey and the other one dedicating his land to the
production of owers, and both of them sell their products in the market. Given this initial
situation, the government calls for the procurement of a project to increase the population
of oaks. As a result, the producer of owers dedicates his land to this environmental project.
However, the oakspopulation will negatively a¤ect the production of honey since bees get
lower quality pollen, which ultimately increases the production costs of honey.
In the second part of this paper I allow for the possibility that every agent who decides
not to participate in the conservation program can benet from a positive externality from his
neighbor (who is developing an environmental project). An example of positive externality
in this context is the case in which the government is interested in increasing the biodiversity
of a lake. Let us now assume that in this area there are two landholders, one of them is
dedicated to a sh farm and the other produces vegetables that are sold in the market. If
the last farmer participates in the procurement of the lakes environmental project, she will
eliminate any pesticide used in the crop of vegetables and will stop dumping toxic waste to
the lake. Therefore, the sh farmer has a direct benet from the environmental project that
his neighbor develops, which nally results in a decrease of his costs of sh production.
There are several authors who have analyzed externalities using mechanism design. Je-
hiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) and (1998) dene the bidders valuation as a vector,
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formed by bidder is valuation for winning and the valuation that he obtains when his op-
ponents win the auction, i.e. the externality that he su¤ers when the object is assigned to a
di¤erent bidder than him. Skreta and Figueroa (2004) also analyze the externality problem
but for the case of auctions with multiple objects. The di¤erence between the existing liter-
ature and this paper is that I consider the externality into the cost function and not in the
bidders valuation, which simplies the solution of the optimal mechanism.
There also exists a vast literature on multidimensional messages or bids. Hansen (1988)
and Desgagne (1988) were some of the authors who rst considered two-dimensional bid
auctions. Dasgupta and Spulber (1990) consider implementation by per unit bid auctions,
where rms o¤er per unit bids against a given quantity schedule. Che (1993) analyzes how
to implement the optimal mechanism via a score-based system of two-dimensional auctions
(quality, price) and Branco (1997) analyzes the impact of costscorrelation on the design of
multidimensional mechanisms. The double dimensionality in this work is represented by the
message that the landholder submits in the mechanism, that is the biodiversity level that
he implements and the cost associated to every level of biodiversity improvement that he
receives in the form of a transfer.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section I describe the model, where all
the analysis is developed under the assumption of negative externalities. In Section 3, I
identify the optimal revelation mechanism. In this part of the paper I nd that the negative
externality plays an important role in the specication of the participation constraint. This is
due to the fact that the landholdersreservation utility is type dependent and endogenous; in
other words, it depends on the cost change that a landholder experiences when his neighbor
implements a particular biodiversity project. In Section 4, I analyze the consequences of
having positive externalities in the mechanism, and an example is developed to understand
the problem that this assumption generates in the mechanism design problem. Finally,
section 5 summarizes the main results.
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3.2 MODEL (WITH NEGATIVE EXTERNALITY)
The objective of the model is to analyze the dilemma that the government faces when it has
to decide the optimal biodiversity to achieve in some specic area, and the cost that it needs
to incur in order to implement it. Additionally, the following model studies the e¤ects that
the externality generated by the biodiversity project has on the nonparticipant landholders.
I consider a mechanism in which the government (seller) owns an indivisible good, that is
the Conservation Program. There exist N risk-neutral2 landholders indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; n,
who are referred to as potential bidders. For simplicity, I assume that the landholders own
the land that the government is interested in improving. Therefore, they are directly a¤ected
by an increase or decrease in biodiversity. Landholders submit messages of the form (Bi; ti)
for a single project that will be developed in his own land, where ti represents the total
cost of the project for the landholder, and BiR+ is a non-monetary variable that reects
the biodiversity improvement in his land due to that particular project. Similarly to Ches
(1993) model, I assume that all non-monetary characteristics related to biodiversity can
be aggregated into a one-dimensional variable Bi, that henceforth will be referred to as
environmental quality.
The implementation of a biodiversity project implies that the landholder has to incur
some costs. The amount of costs will vary depending of the landholders type,  2 .
Assume that each landholder has private information about his costs of implementing a
market activity or biodiversity project, denoted by the parameter . Landholders cost
parameters are independent and identically distributed with cumulative distribution of the
cost parameter given by F () dened on ;  which is common knowledge among both
landholders and the government.
Landholder is cost function when he participates in the conservation program is repre-
2Landholders are sometimes considered to be risk averse. Empirical studies assessing landholders con-
servation attitudes in this respect, however, do not reach a unanimous judgement. Hence, the risk-neutrality
assumption neither seems too restrictive nor contrary to empirical evidence.
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sented by Ci(Bi; ). I assume that costs are increasing in the environmental quality, CB > 0,
at an increasing rate, CBB > 0, i.e. the cost function is increasing and convex in Bi. More-
over, Ci(0; ) = 0 which implies zero x cost. Additionally, I consider that higher types of 
more e¢ cient landholdershave lower marginal costs of improving environmental quality,
CB < 0. Furthermore, the landholder is cost function when he produces a market good
is CMi (q; B i; ). It is increasing in the amount of market good produced, C
M
q > 0, at an
increasing rate, CMqq > 0. Similarly to the cost function of producing biodiversity, I consider
that higher types of  have lower marginal costs of producing market goods, CMq < 0. Below
I specied how CMi (q; B i; ) increases in the case of negative externalities or decreases in
the case of positive externalities.
The governments utility when landholder i develops the conservation program is the
following:
Ug(Bi; ti) = V (Bi)  ti
where ti represents the governments transfer to landholder i. Hence, it is important to
take into account that when the landholder is proposing a project that generates an environ-
mental quality (in biodiversity terms) of Bi, he also produces a utility to the government that
is represented by function V (Bi): In particular, I assume that function V (Bi) is increasing
and concave in Bi, i.e. VBB() < 0 < VB(), with V (0) = 0. That is, if the project does not
generate any biodiversity improvement then the governments utility from it equals zero.
Moreover, I consider that the government maximizes expected social welfare. The social
welfare consists of the sum of the utility that the government derives from each landholders
implemented biodiversity level, V (Bi), minus the welfare cost of raising public funds, (1+)ti.
W =
nX
i=1
(V (Bi)  (1 + )ti)
On the other hand, landholders is utility is represented by:
Ul(Bi; ti) = (i produces biodiversity)[ti   Ci(Bi; )] +
(i does not produce biodiversity)

   CMi (q; B i; )

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where () is an indicator function  () 2 f0; 1g, and  () = 1 if landholder i produces
biodiversity and  () = 0 if landholder  i 6= i develops de conservation program. In the
last case, I assume that landholder i dedicates his land to some market activity q where he
obtains prots equal to  (which are assumed to be the same for all the non-participating
landholders). However, since landholder  i develops a project that increases the biodiver-
sity, a negative externality is generated to the non-participating landholders, B i, that can
be translated into an increase in landholder is costs. Notice that in this part of the paper I
assume that the environmental improvement generates a negative externality which is trans-
mitted through an increase in the cost of all other landholders those who do not participate
in the auctionwho work in a non-environmental (market) activity, q. Additionally, in spite
of receiving the same environmental negative externality, B i, the e¤ect that this external-
ity causes in two di¤erent non-participating landholders is distinct, since each of them has
a di¤erent cost function CMi (q; B i; i) given his own realization of the e¢ ciency parameter
i, CMB i > 0. In other words, the externality is type dependent.
For the landholders who are not participating in the conservation program, their cost
function, CMi (q; B i; i), is increasing in q and, given the negative externality assumption,
we have that CMqB i > 0, i.e. the marginal cost of producing q increases in the negative
externality received B i. For simplicity, I consider that any landholder i, when receiving
no externalities, B i = 0, is as e¢ cient producing the market activity as he is generating
biodiversity (when he wins the contract) for any realization of i. Finally, in order to clarify
the structure of this model, I describe the move order of the game as follows.
1. Nature chooses the type of every landholder, , which is distributed in

; 

.This type
conditions the landholders cost function. The landholder privately observes his own type.
He does not know the others landholderstypes, and the government cannot observe the
realization of any landholders type.
2. The government wants to improve the biodiversity level of some specic area.
3. All landholders who live in the area report their messages composed by the amount
of biodiversity that will be achieved and the cost of the project associated with this
biodiversity level, which he will receive in the form of a transfer from the government.
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4. The government chooses the optimal project to be implemented.
5. Those landholders who do not produce biodiversity dedicate their land to some market
activity.
6. Those landholders who produce biodiversity generate some negative (or positive in section
4) externality to the all nonparticipating landholders in their surroundings.
3.3 OPTIMAL REVELATION MECHANISM
In this section I describe and solve the optimal direct revelation mechanism that the govern-
ment uses in order to maximize the expected social welfare from the biodiversity projects,
subject to the landholdersincentive compatibility conditions and their individual rationality
(or voluntary participation) constraints. Generally, in this context a mechanism (p;B; t) has
the following components: a message (B; t) for each buyer i; an allocation rule, pi, which
determines the probability that landholder i will get the object and a payment rule t. Notice
that
p : ! , where  :=
(
 2 RN+ j
NX
i=1
i  1
)
is the set of probability vectors. For simplicity, I work with a direct revelation mechanism,
where the strategy space coincides with the type space, and thus, each agents strategy is just
to announce a type. Hence thereafter, I use the Revelation Principle, and as a consequence
the mechanism can be expressed as (p(i); B(i); t(i)), and understood as a mapping from
the set of revealed types  to the set of allocation rule pi 2 [0; 1], biodiversity improvement
Bi 2 R+ and transfers ti 2 R+.
Notice that in any mechanism function pi must satisfy
P
pi(i)  1 and pi(i)  0. I
restrict, however, the analysis to deterministic revelation mechanisms, given that the gov-
ernment never wants to randomize over the selected landholders. Therefore the landholders
selected by the procurer implement a biodiversity improvement in their land, while all the
other landholders have a project with zero biodiversity improvement. The former can be in-
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terpreted as not developing the project in their land. Then the mechanism can be expressed
by a pair of functions (B(i); t(i))3.
In order to ensure that the auction mechanism is feasible, it must satisfy the participa-
tion constraints (P.C.) and that the incentive compatibility (I.C.) conditions hold for all N
landholders. In particular, the mechanism (B(i); t(i)) satises the participation constraint
if
Ui(Bi(i); ti(i); i)     E[CMi (q; B i; i)] 8i 2

; 

(P.C.)
where the reservation utility,  E

[CMi (q; B i; i)], represents landholder is net benet
when he does not participate in the auction, i.e.  is the landholder is revenue when he
dedicates his land to some economic activity, where   t. Since the seller is implementing
the mechanism, he can control both B (i) and t (i). However, he needs to construct an ex-
pectation about the expected cost of the landholder when not participating in environmental
activities, given that the principal does not know the realization of  for every landholder.
Additionally, this participation constraint is type-dependent, given that the above reser-
vation utility is increasing in , i.e. higher values of  imply lower marginal costs when
dedicating his land to market activities, and as consequence higher reservation utilities. In
contrast, this reservation utility is decreasing in the negative externality, B i, since an in-
crease in B i increases the production cost of the market activity q which nally decreases
the reservation utility. Hence, the rate of increase of the marginal cost of producing bio-
diversity, CBB(Bi; i), is lower than the rate of increase of the marginal cost of producing
an economic good (taking into account the negative externality produced by his neighbors),
CMqB(q; B i; ) for any . That is,
CBB(Bi; i) < C
M
qB(q; B i; i) 8i 2

; 

3Note that in more general mechanisms Bi and ti may depend on others landholderstypes. However,
this will generate a verication problem, since the transfer landholder i receives would depend on types he
does not observe. In order to overcome this problem I restrict the model to those mechanisms in which Bi
and ti depend only on landholder is own type.
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In other words, the cost function of developing market activities and receiving a negative
externality from your neighbors lies above the cost function of developing environmental
activities and not receiving any kind of negative externalityfor all values of . That is,
the previous assumption guarantees that all the participants in the procurement auction
have incentives to participate4.
Moreover, the mechanism (B(); t()) is said to be incentive compatible for landholder i
if he experiences a greater utility by revealing his type i truthfully than by reporting any
other type bi 6= i.
Ui(Bi(i); ti(i); i)  Ui(Bi(bi); ti(bi); i) 8i 2 ;  and 8 bi 6= i (I.C.)
Finally, let us assume that the hazard rate function  () = f()
1 F () is increasing in . The
former assumption is a su¢ cient condition to ensure that the design problem is regular.
Using the revelation principle, it is possible to dene a direct revelation mechanism
(B(); t()) which can be used in the governments expected social welfare maximization
problem.
max
fBi();ti()g
E
"
NX
i=1
(V (Bi(i))  (1 + )ti(i))
#
Moreover, landholder is utility of truthfully revealing his type i and being assigned, as
a consequence, a project with biodiversity level Bi (i) and transfer ti (i) is:
Ui(Bi; i) = ti(i)  Ci(Bi(i); i)
4The negative externality only a¤ects the cost of producing a market good. In the absence of externalities
the landholder can produce a market good or a biodiversity project at the same marginal cost. In the case
of negative externalities, however, the growth rate of the marginal cost of producing a biodiversity project
is always lower than that of producing a market good.
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Therefore, the governments maximization problem can be expressed as follows:
max
fBi();U()g
E
"
NX
i=1
(V (Bi(i))  (1 + )[Ci(Bi(i); ) + Ui(i)])
#
subject to
B() is nondecreasing in  2 ;  (1)
Ui(i) = Ui(i) 
iZ

@Ci(Bi(x); x)dx
@i
8i 2

; 

(Incentive compatibility, see appendix)
(2)
Ui(i)  (   E[CMi (q; B i; i)]) (Participation constraint) (3)
That is, the government wants to maximize the expected social welfare generated by the
biodiversity project that every landholder develops, subject to the fact that these contracts
with the landholders are feasible, i.e. they satisfy the incentive compatibility and participa-
tion constraint conditions specied above. Solving the governments maximization problem
(see appendix) we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1
Let (t; B) be the optimal mechanism. Then, the optimal menu of contracts specifying
a biodiversity level to be implemented, Bi () and a transfer t

i () to be received for the
implementation of such biodiversity level must satisfy,
V (Bi(i))
dBi
= (1 + )

@Ci(Bi(i); i)
@Bi
  1  F (i)
f(i)
@2Ci(Bi(i); i)
@Bi@i

and
ti () = (1 + )

Ci(Bi(); )  1  F (i)
f(i)
@Ci(Bi(); )
@

8  2 ;  and 8 i 2 N
Proof. See appendix.
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Hence, the optimal biodiversity that a landholder generates depends on his e¢ ciency
level, the welfare cost of raising public funds and on the hazard rate of its private parameter,
. On the other hand, the optimal transfer is equal to the landholders cost when he dedicates
his land to develop a biodiversity project. Additionally, from the above proposition we can
infer that those landholders who have low types () will obtain a higher transfer if they decide
to participate in the procurement. This is due to the fact that they are not so e¢ cient in
producing biodiversity, and as a consequence the government has to make a higher e¤ort
(in terms of transfers) to induce them to participate in a biodiversity project. On the other
hand, e¢ cient landholders receive lower transfers since they are more a¤ected by the negative
externality than their ine¢ cient counterparts. This reduces their incentives to continue the
production of market goods, ultimately inducing them to produce biodiversity.
3.4 BILATERAL POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EXTERNALITY
In sections 2 and 3 we assumed that the externality su¤ered by the landholder was always
negative. However, in this section I want to relax the former assumption. As a consequence,
thereafter I assume that agents can receive negative or positive externalities from the biodi-
versity project that his neighbors develop5. Hence, the biodiversity quality generated by a
landholder  i and received by all of his neighbors i ( i 6= i), who are not participating, can
be B i 7 0.
All the assumptions coincide with those in sections 2 and 3 except for the participation
constraint. The reason why the participation constraint di¤ers is explained as follows. The
reservation utility is as in the previous section type dependent and increasing in , but now
it is increasing in B i, in contrast to the previous section where it was decreasing. Indeed,
now the positive externality produced by surrounding landholders decreases landholder is
costs of developing market activities, which in turn increases his reservation utility. This
makes voluntary participation of all landholders more di¢ cult to guarantee than in the case
5I do not analyze the case where B i is equal to zero, given that in this case the reservation utility will
simply be represented by the market prots, , which can be normalized to zero. Therefore, the mechanism
design problem when B i = 0 becomes the classical one. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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Low Types High Types
Positive CBB> C
M
qB Participate No incentives to participate
Negative CBB< C
M
qB Participate Participate
Table 1: Di¤erences between positive and negative externalities
of negative externalities, since a landholders payo¤ when not participating is higher in the
case of positive externality than when receiving a negative one.
Given the positive and negative externality, the cost function for the landholder who
decides to not participate in the conservation program can be generalized as follow,
CMi (q; B i; i) = Ci(q; B1; :::; Bi 1; Bi+1; :::; BN ; i)
where landholder i is producing a market product q and he is receiving positive or negative
externalities from landholders that are developing a biodiversity project. The above cost
function can also be expressed as CMi (q;
NP
 i6=i
B i; i). Hence, we have to impose some strict
assumption on the marginal cost function since it can be increasing or decreasing depending
on the value of B i, that is CMqB i() ? 0. Table 1 highlights the di¤erences between the
presence of negative externalities, as in the previous sections, and positive externalities in
the model.
In order to understand the e¤ects that a positive or negative externality has in landhold-
erscost function and as a consequence in his decision to participate in the conservation
programwe will develop the following example.
Example
Let us assume that there exist three landholders in some specic area where the gov-
ernment is interested in improving the biodiversity. The market benets that these three
landholders can obtain when they are dedicating their land to produce some market activity
is equal to  = 30. Moreover, when a landholder does not participate his costs and the
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Landholders B1 B2 B3 Costs
Landholder 1 0 6 -10 30
Landholder 2 5 0 -6 15
Landholder 3 -7 -9 0 15
Table 2: Example of positive and negative externalities
biodiversity impact that he experiences from the participating landholders is presented in
table 2.
Notice that numbers with positive sign represent positive externalities while numbers
with negative signs represent negative externalities that landholder i su¤ers from his neigh-
bors  i 6= i when he does not produce biodiversity. For instance, when landholder 2 does
not participate he receives a positive externality from the environmental project developed
by landholder 1 of ve units, and a negative externality of six units from landholder 3s
activities. Finally, the last column expresses landholder 2s costs from continuing his market
activities. Now, with all the above information we can analyze the participation constraint
for each landholder.
Landholder 1: U1(B1(1); t1(1); 1)     CM1 (q;
P
 i6=1
B i; 1)
() U1(B1(1); t1(1); 1)  30  (30  6 + 10) =  4
Landholder 2: U2(B2(2); t2(2); 2)     CM2 (q;
P
 i6=2
B i; 2)
() U2(B2(2); t2(2); 2 T 30  (15  5 + 6) = 14
Landholder 3: U3(B3(3); t3(3); 3)     CM3 (q;
P
 i6=3
B i; 3)
() U3(B3(3); t3(3); 3)  30  (15 + 7 + 9) =  1
Clearly landholders 1 and 3 have incentives to participate in the biodiversity program.
Landholder 2, however, has incentives to be a free rider given the positive externality that
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he receives from his neighborand to not participate in the procurement. In particular, the
government would have to o¤er him some transfer greater than his market net benet of
14 to induce him to participate. Additionally, note that landholders 2 and 3 have exactly
the same cost (we can say that they are equally e¢ cient in market activities). However,
landholder 3 is receiving a very high negative impact when not participating, what nally
induces him to participate in the auction, since he will obtain a higher utility developing an
environmental project than conducting a market activity. Therefore, from the example we
can infer that the impact of a positive externality may generate incentives to not participate
in the environmental project for some landholders, i.e. landholder 2. N
Let us focus from now on in the case where the landholder is enjoying an overall positive
impact from externalities
NP
 i=1
B i > 0. The participation constraint was dened as,
Ui(Bi(i); ti(i); i)     E[CMi (q; B i; i)]
In the case of positive externalities CMqB < 0, i.e., the marginal cost of developing market
activities for the nonparticipating landholder decreases in the positive externality he receives
from the participating neighbors. Additionally, the growth rate of the marginal cost of
participating in an environmental project, CBB, is higher or equal than the growth rate of
the marginal costs of production in the market, in absolute value, CMqB, i.e., CBB  CMqB.
Obviously in this situation those types with a lower  will be interested in participating, but
not those with higher .
The optimal transfer obtained in proposition 1 is not applicable for the case of posi-
tive externalities. As commented above, this is due to the fact that the reservation utility
specied for the participation constraint is nondecreasing in  more e¢ cient landholders
nd market activities more convenient than less e¢ cient landholderswhich induces these
e¢ cient landholders to not participate. Therefore, given the above restriction, I introduce
a useful assumption that will help us nd an optimal solution when the non-participating
landholders are enjoying a positive externality from their neighbors. Specically, from now
on, I assume that the government is interested in developing the biodiversity project in those
areas in which landholders are less e¢ cient, i.e,. low .
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The above assumption can be rationalized by considering the following example. City
councils usually develop projects, such as the construction of a museum or a public university,
in an area that is considered a "bad" neighborhood. In spite of this adjective, however, the
city council expects that this project can positively transform the neighborhood where it
is being implemented. In our particular case, the government is interested in developing
the biodiversity project in those lands where the landholder is less e¢ cient (low ). Given
that higher types are more e¢ cient producing the market activity, q, they will obtain more
benets in the market than those landholders who have lower types. So, we need to nd
a cuto¤ that induces the participation of those ine¢ cient types who belong to some rangeh
;bi, where b < , which I nd in the next proposition. In addition, from section 3, we know
that the rst order condition of the relaxed problem is given by the following expression,
which I use next.
V (Bi())
dBi
  (1 + )@Ci(Bi(); )
@Bi
+ (1 + )
@2Ci(Bi(); )
@Bi@i
1  F (i)
f(i)
= 0 8 2 ;  (4)
Proposition 2
In the case of a positive externality, the optimal transfer t() is given by
ti () = (1 + )

Ci(Bi(); )  1  F (i)
f(i)
@Ci(Bi(); )
@

for all  2
h
;bi, where b < . In particular, b is the type for which
V (Bi(b)) = (1 + ) Ci(Bi(b);b)  CMi (q; B i;b)1  F (bi)
f(bi)   @Ci(Bi(
b);b)
@b 1  F (bi)f(bi)
!
and all landholders with types  2 (b; ] do not participate in the auction.
Note that for the highest type
 


the above result is obvious. If we assume that  
U [0; 1], and using expression (4) for , the inverse hazard rate becomes zero and therefore
the optimal transfer for the highest type is equal to the cost of the project. However, given
the assumption CBB  CMqB, this implies that  the most e¢ cient landholderdoes not
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participate in the procurement. On the other hand, for all landholders with lower types
 2
h
;bi, where b < , we have that the marginal cost of producing a market activity is
equal to the marginal cost of generating biodiversity given a level of received (respectively,
produced) externality in the interval
h
0; bBi. That is,
CMq (q; B i; i) = CB (B; i) 8i 2
h
;bi
and the marginal cost of developing a market activity is lower than the marginal cost
of producing biodiversity for biodiversity levels in the interval
 bB;+1, as the following
gure 3 illustrates.
CMq (q; B i; i) < CB (B; i) 8 2
hb; i
Figure 3: Low types produce biodiversity
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3.5 CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The existence of negative or positive externalities in the development of a biodiversity project
has clear consequences in the solution of an optimal mechanism that solves the governments
expected social welfare maximization problem. Specically, the assumption that the exter-
nality directly a¤ects the cost function of the nonparticipating landholders in the surround-
ings gives us a new perspective to analyze the consequences of externalities in the design of
a procurement auction.
In the case of a negative externality I found that the optimal transfer depends on the
e¢ ciency of the landholder. In particular, this paper shows that those e¢ cient landholders
with high types receive lower transfers. This result is based on the assumption that the
rate of increase of the marginal cost of producing biodiversity, CBB(Bi; ), is lower than the
rate of increase of the marginal cost of producing an economic good (taking into account the
negative externality received from his neighbors), CMqB(q; B i; ), what induces all landholders
to participate in the conservation program.
On the other hand, positive externalities seem to be more involved than negative ones.
Specically, the landholders reservation utility and specied in the participation constraint
of the governments problemis nondecreasing in his type, . This implies that higher types
are not willing to participate in the development of a biodiversity project, since positive
externalities decrease the marginal cost of developing market activities for those landholders
who do not participate in the environmental project, i.e., CMq (q; B i; ) < C
M
B (Bi; ).
In order to deal with positive externalities, I assumed that the government is only in-
terested in inducing the participation of those less e¢ cient landholders. Therefore, those
landholders who live in the area where the government wants to improve the biodiversity
and are less e¢ cient (low types) will be the ones selected to develop the biodiversity project.
In contrast, the more e¢ cient landholders of such area will enjoy the positive externality
that will result in a decrease of their cost of producing market activities. In addition, as in
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the negative externality case, an optimal biodiversity schedule Bi () and an optimal transfer
function ti () are identied in the presence of positive externalities.
The contributions of the paper can, then, be analyzed with respect to the mechanism
design literature on one hand, and the environmental economics e¤orts on methods to eval-
uate environmental quality on the other hand. Firstly, regarding the mechanism design
literature, this paper considers the possibility of positive and negative externalities among
players by introducing them into the landholderscost functions, what greatly simplies the
analysis as compared to Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1999). Secondly, with respect
to the environmental economics literature dealing with traditional methods of evaluating the
environmental impact of a project, this paper shows that we can design mechanisms where
participants are induced to truthfully report the e¤ects they receive from an externality.
Indeed, most of the methods proposed by this literature such as the Cost-Benet analysis
and the Cost E¤ectiveness methodare constantly criticized because of their inability to
induce a truthful revelation of the e¤ect that a certain externality may have in the utility
function of those individuals a¤ected by the externality. Through the mechanism described
in this paper, however, this information problem is solved by the use of an appropriately
designed procurement auction.
Further extensions can be considered for this paper. For example it may be interesting
to analyze the model developed in this study but considering risk averse landholders. This
assumption is more realistic, given that usually landholders are a¤ected by uncontrollable
variables such as weather, natural disasters, etc., which might induce a more risk averse
behavior. The correlation of the landholderstypes or assuming the externality as a random
variable, uncontrollable by the government, can both be considered for further research.
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4.0 THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREGONE OPTIONS: GENERALIZING
SOCIAL COMPARISONS IN SEQUENTIAL-MOVE GAMES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in behavioral economics allow for the possibility that individuals care about
the payo¤s of others. In particular, most of these advances suggest the existence of social,
as opposed to individual, preferences reecting individualspredilection for fairness in the
income distribution; see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
Despite the multiple situations that can be rationalized with these approaches, a recent
literature suggests that individualsbehavior cannot be explained by theories on social pref-
erences alone. Specically, an agents choices can only be supported by analyzing how she
evaluates other playerschosen and unchosen actions. For example, Brandts and Solà (2001),
Falk et al. (2003) and Charness and Rabin (2002) accumulate signicant evidence supporting
the importance of unchosen alternatives in the ultimatum bargaining game, while Andreoni,
Brown and Vesterlund (2002) show the relevance of unchosen alternatives in public good
games. In order to illustrate their results, let us briey analyze Brandts and Solàs (2001)
study. In particular, they examine an ultimatum bargaining game in which the proposer is
called to choose among only two alternative divisions of the pie (which we normalize to a
size of one) as the gures 4 and 5 below illustrate.
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Proposer
Responder Responder
(0.2, 0.8) (0, 0) (0.125, 0.875)
A AR R
(0.2, 0.8) (0.125, 0.875)
(0, 0)
Figure 4: Responder accepts
Proposer
Responder Responder
(0.2, 0.8) (0, 0) (0.875, 0.125)
A AR R
(0.2, 0.8) (0.875, 0.125)
(0, 0)
Figure 5: Responder rejects
Specically, they consider two treatments. In the rst one, represented in gure 4, the
proposer chooses among two divisions of the pie, (0.2,0.8) and (0.125,0.875)  where the
rst and second component of every pair denote the receiver and proposers payo¤, respec-
tively. In the second treatment, as gure 5 indicates, the rst available division (0.2,0.8) is
unchanged, while the second division becomes (0.875,0.125). Importantly, they show that,
conditional on division 0.2 being o¤ered to the responder (bold lines in the gures), the
proportion of receivers rejections is signicantly higher when the unchosen division of the
pie that the proposer did not select was 0.875 (gure 5) than when it was 0.125 (gure 4).
That is, for a given o¤er 0.2 to the responder, the proportion of rejections increases in the
share of the pie that the responder could have received. Intuitively, the receiver positively
evaluates a given o¤er when the alternative division of the pie is below the actual o¤er
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that the proposer makes him (he infers kindness), and negatively otherwise (he interprets
unkindness). Certainly, the receivers pattern of rejections cannot be rationalized using
inequity aversion. Indeed, once o¤er (0.2,0.8) is made in both treatments, the inequity in the
payo¤ distribution is constant across treatments, and yet the receivers behavior is di¤erent
across treatments. The receivers rejecting pattern cannot be explained using chosen actions
either, since the proposers chosen o¤er is constant across treatments but the receivers be-
havior is not. Instead, any rationalization of the previous results must rely on the receivers
comparison between the actions that the proposer chooses and those he does not (unchosen
actions).
References to unchosen actions are nevertheless not restricted to economic contexts
alone. For instance, we frequently encounter references to unchosen alternatives in the
way in which many national and international policies are announced to the media. In-
deed, these public presentations are often accompanied with statements like The govern-
ment/organization/rm had to choose between policies A and B, and choosing A would have
been so much worse that we nally decided to select B.These statements are certainly ef-
fective when they induce the listener to positively evaluate the chosen action B relative to
the unchosen action A.
In this study we introduce a model that rationalizes these economic conducts in com-
plete information sequential-move games within a general framework of economic behavior.
Specically, we assume that as in standard models, every player cares about her material
payo¤. Additionally, we consider that every individual compares other playersactually cho-
sen actions with respect to a particular action that they could have selected (other players
foregone actions). Hence, this particular action is used by every individual as a reference
point to measure the kindness she perceives from other playerschoices.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, we identify conditions under which
playersequilibrium actions are higher when individuals are concerned about these reference-
dependent comparisons than when they are not. In particular, this set of conditions allow
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for a direct prediction about whether players cooperation when they are concerned about
relative comparisons is either higher or lower than in standard game-theoretic models, for
a broad class of relative comparisons players might use. Importantly, it examines players
cooperation even when they are not concerned about each others material payo¤s. Indeed,
unlike models with inequity averse individuals where players do care about other individu-
alspayo¤s (social preferences), this paper analyzes conditions under which agents choose
higher strategy levels than in standard models without the need to assume that they care
about other peoples payo¤s, i.e., even when agentspreferences can be regarded as strictly
individualistic. Second, we show that the model this paper describes embeds as special
cases existing behavioral models: from models on inequity aversion to those analyzing social
status acquisition. Finally, we apply our model to di¤erent economic applications where we
enhance the intuitions behind our results: the ultimatum bargaining game, the labor market
gift exchange game, and the sequential public good game. Our equilibrium predictions are
not only validated in these applied settings, but also conrmed by recent experimental data.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss the literature
on social preferences and intentions-based reciprocity, their relationship with our paper,
and how it complements their approach. In section three, we describe the properties that
playersutility function must satisfy in order to support our results in terms of higher de-
grees of cooperation. Furthermore, section four analyzes players equilibrium strategy in
these sequential-move games, and section ve applies the model to three economic exam-
ples. Finally, the last section discusses some conclusions of the paper as well as its further
extensions.
4.2 RELATED LITERATURE
4.2.1 Theoretical literature on social preferences
The literature on behavioral economics has extensively considered elements other than ones
own payo¤ in individualsutility function. This literature mainly deals with the so-called
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other regarding preferences, since most of the papers in this area focus their attention
on analyzing to what extent players care about the payo¤s of his competitors, or about
the distribution of payo¤s in the entire population. In this respect, some papers on inequity
aversion, such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) play a prominent
role. On one hand, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) consider in their two-player version the following
utility function for player i
Ui(xi; xj) = xi   imaxfxj   xi; 0g   imaxfxi   xj; 0g (4.1)
where xi is player is payo¤. Intuitively, i represents the disutility from allocations that
are disadvantageously unequal for player i (i.e., he may feel envy about player js payo¤s),
while i denotes the guilt feeling from being the agent with the highest payo¤ of the pop-
ulation.1 Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) also develop a similar (yet more general) model of
inequity aversion in which individualsutility is assumed to be increasing and concave in
their share of total income, i.e., people experience a positive but diminishing marginal util-
ity from receiving a higher share of the total amount of social payo¤s. These models of social
preferences, however, cannot rationalize the puzzling experimental evidence presented in the
introduction.2 Indeed, any model which explains such results must necessarily complement
the above specication by introducing the importance of unchosen alternatives into player
is utility function, as this paper examines.3
1Interestingly, Blanco et al (2007) present experimental evidence supporting inequity aversion at the
aggregate level (across all participants of a particular game) but refuting it at the individual level (for a
particular participant across games). Their results can be conrmed by our model, whereby participants of
a particular game exhibit concerns for unchosen alternatives, but they may use di¤erent foregone options
across games as a reference point for comparison.
2Another interesting experimental paper that also tests whether payo¤ distributions su¢ ce to explain
playersbehavior in the ultimatum bargaining game is Bereby-Meyer and Niederle (2005). Specically, they
show that the responder is more likely to reject low o¤ers when a rejection payo¤ is accrued to a third
player  with no strategic role in the ultimatum bargaining game than when such payo¤ is accrued to the
proposer.
3Some axiomatic approaches on inequity aversion, such as Segal and Sobel (1999), examine what condi-
tions on playerspreferences must be satised in order to obtain utility functions which can be represented
as a weighted average of a players own material payo¤ as well as that of others. Despite their interest,
our approach di¤ers from theirs, since we not only include playersactually chosen actions in their utility
function (as they do), but also playersunchosen actions.
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4.2.2 Models on intentions-based reciprocity
As suggested above, this paper is more in the line of Charness and Rabin (2002), whereby
they analyze the intentions that players express with their actual choices along the game.
In particular, they assume that agents evaluate multiple characteristics of the equilibrium
allocation  including fairness and intentions by establishing di¤erent comparisons be-
tween own and social payo¤s (i.e., between xi and xj). Specically, when only intentions are
considered, agent is utility function in Charness and Rabins (2002) model reduces to
Ui(xi; xj) =
8<: xi + (xi   xj) if player j misbehavedxi otherwise (4.2)
where player js misbehavior can implicitly include player is concern about player js fore-
gone options, and where  represents the importance of intentions-based reciprocity for player
i. Note, however, that player is disutility from player js misbehavior is scaled up by the
di¤erence between player i and js payo¤s, xi   xj. Certainly, this confounds the elements
triggering such perception of misbehavior (which implicitly includes unchosen alternatives),
and how this misbehavior is then measured (by considering inequity aversion). Likewise,
most of the experimental literature testing reciprocating behaviors triggered by kind inten-
tions also considers that agent i measures player js intentions by comparing xi and xj; see
Cox (2001, 2003).
Similarly, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) recently analyze how a given player i evaluates the
kindness inferred from player js actions by also comparing their payo¤s. In particular, that
study measures kindness by considering the product of two elements: the above interpersonal
payo¤ comparison (what they refer as the outcome term), and a measure of other players
intentions which reects the set of available choices for these players (the intentions factor).
Hence, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) assume that the reference standard with which players
compare their own payo¤ is that of other players (i.e., the payo¤ distribution), and then
they scale up this payo¤ distribution according to the degree of freedom in the other players
available choices.
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Finally, Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj (2007) construct a nonparametric model in which
a players preferences become more altruistic with respect to other players when she infers
that these players have behaved generously with her. However, their notion of generosity
is not equivalent to our denition of kindness, nor their notion of altruism coincides with
our denition of reciprocity, since they assume that players compare their payo¤s with that
of others in their group. Unlike these models, we do not introduce other peoples payo¤s
into player is evaluation of intentions or kindness. Instead, in our model player i measures
the kindness in player js actions by comparing player js chosen and unchosen (foregone)
actions. In the following section we describe how this comparison is made, and how it
encompasses models on inequity aversion and intentions-based reciprocity as special cases.
4.3 MODEL
Let us consider complete information sequential-move games with two players and two stages.
In particular, we examine games G = hSi; Sj;ui; uji, in which a female leader (player j)
selects an action sj 2 Sj  R+, and afterwards a male follower (player i) chooses an action
si 2 Si  R+. The leaders action may represent, for instance, her wage o¤er to a worker,
or her monetary contribution to a public good. Similarly, the followers action may denote,
respectively, his e¤ort level in a labor market game, or his monetary donation to a charity
in the sequential public good game. (Note that for simplicity we describe our model for
continuous action spaces. Nonetheless, all our assumptions can be extended to discrete
action spaces as well). Every action prole s = (si; sj) 2 Si  Sj is then mapped into the
set of possible outcomes by function out : Si  Sj ! X. Note that an outcome, out(s),
in the ultimatum bargaining game is a monetary amount, while in public good games is a
pair composed of an amount of private goods and the total contributions to the public good.
Finally, every player i assigns a utility value to every outcome through her utility function
ui : X ! R.
Note that the outcome function maps every action prole into a single outcome, i.e.,
there is a unique action prole leading to every terminal node of the game. Hence, for every
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outcome out(s) 2 X we can identify the unique action prole s = (si; sj) which induces this
outcome. This allows utility function ui : X ! R to be represented over action proles in
the form UNCi : SiSj ! R, i.e., UNCi (si; sj) 2 R. Specically, superscript NC denotes that
player i is not concernedabout player js unchosen alternatives, as opposed to superscript
C, which we use in the next section to refer to players who are concerned about each
othersunchosen actions. Finally, let us henceforth denote by single (double) subscripts in
the utility function its rst (and second) order derivatives.
Assumption A1. Positive but decreasing marginal benet from other playersactions,
sj. That is, UNCsj (si; sj)  0  UNCsjsj(si; sj) for all si and sj.
Thus, every player i benets from increases in other playersactions, but at a decreasing
rate. Note that we are deliberately vague about how UNCi (si; sj) increases (or decreases)
in her own action si. In this way, we can capture models where playersmarginal utility
from increasing her action is positive (e.g., contributions in public good games) as well as
negative (e.g., e¤ort in labor market games). Next, we assume that player is utility function
is strictly concave in his own actions, si.
Assumption A2. Concavity. UNCsisi (si; sj) < 0 for all si and sj.
Note that concavity did not hold in the motivating example discussed in the introduction
since playersaction space was discrete and binary. Nonetheless, we introduce this assump-
tion given that it guarantees the existence of a unique equilibrium when playersaction space
is continuous. In particular, uniqueness will facilitate the comparison of the equilibrium pre-
diction when players are not concerned about unchosen alternatives, and that when players
are concerned.4
4In the case of discrete and binary action spaces, as those in the motivating example of the ultimatum
bargaining game, concavity is not necessary. Instead, in order to facilitate the comparison of our results and
those of standard models, we only need the subgame perfect equilibrium to be unique, both when players
are concerned about foregone options and when they are not.
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Assumption A3. Strategic Substitutability. Player js (rst mover) utility function
satises UNCsjsi (si; sj) < 0 for all si and sj.
Thus, the rst movers marginal benet from increasing her own action, sj, decreases
when the second mover raises her action, si. That is, the leader considers the followers
actions as strategic substitutes of her own. This assumption is sensible for a large class of
games, where players try to free-ride each othersactions, e.g., the rst movers incentives to
free-ride the second movers donations to the public good or his e¤ort decision. Therefore,
A3 eliminates payo¤ structures such as those in the impunity game, whereby (in a variation
of the ultimatum bargaining game) the rst mover obtains exactly the same payo¤ regardless
of the second movers actions, i.e., unconditional on his acceptance or rejection of the rst
movers o¤er. In contrast, A3 maintains the rst movers incentives to free-ride the second
movers action, since she considers playersactions as strategic substitutes.
4.3.1 How kindness enters into playerspreferences
As suggested in the motivating example from Brandts and Solà (2001), playersobserved
behavior is clearly inconsistent across the games in their example. The games they consider
are nevertheless relatively similar, since only the set of available choices for the proposer
is modied. In particular, we want to describe a single utility function which is general
enough to be applicable to games maintaining similarproperties, as the two treatments
considered by Brandts and Solà (2001). Specically, in this paper we regard games as being
similar when the utility that player i obtains from every action prole s coincides across the
games for which this action prole induces the same outcome out(s), and out(s) 2 X. (In
the previous example of the ultimatum bargaining game, if a given action prole induces the
same outcome across di¤erent games then the utility that players obtain from this action
prole coincide across these games.) In particular, let UCi (si; sj) represent the utility function
we apply to this class of games. Specically, UCi (si; sj) is player is utility function when
he uses player js foregone options as a measure of the kindness behind her actions. Let us
rst describe how this kindness enters into player is utility function, and then analyze how
players measure the kindness behind their opponents actions.
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Assumption A4. Kindness. For any actions si 2 Si and sj 2 Sj, player is utility
function satises
UCi (si; sj)  UNCi (si; sj) if kindness
UCi (si; sj) < U
NC
i (si; sj) if unkindness
Therefore, this assumption determines when player i is concerned about social compar-
isons and he interprets kindness from player js actions, his utility level is higher than when
he is not concerned about these comparisons. Otherwise (when he infers unkindness), his
utility level is lower. Let us next describe how this kindness a¤ects player is marginal utility.
Assumption A5. Reciprocity. For any actions si 2 Si and sj 2 Sj, player is utility
function satises
UCsi (si; sj)  UNCsi (si; sj) if kindness
UCsi (si; sj) < U
NC
si
(si; sj) if unkindness
Hence, A5 species that when player i interprets kindness from player js actions, his
marginal utility from increasing si when he is concerned about foregone options is weakly
higher than when he is not. Otherwise, his marginal utility is lower. This property is
illustrated in gure 20 (see appendix). In particular, this assumption leads player i to
increase his action when he infers kindness (positive reciprocity), and to decrease it when he
infers unkindness (negative reciprocity).
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4.3.2 How players measure kindness
Let us now describe how players evaluate the kindness behind other playersactions. In par-
ticular, we assume that player i measures kindness through the following distance function,
Di(si; sj), and that he infers kindness when the outcome of this distance function is positive,
and unkindness otherwise.
Di(si; sj) = i

sj   sRij (si; sj)

(4.3)
for any i 2 R, where i can be both positive or negative. Thus, player i evaluates player
js kindness by comparing player js actually chosen action, sj, and a particular reference
action that player i uses for comparison, sRij (si; sj) 2 Sj, among player js available choices,
as dened below.5 For simplicity, this distance function was chosen to be linear. Nonetheless,
from a more general perspective, player is distance function could be nonlinear, as long as
it increases in player js actually chosen strategy, sj, and decreases in the reference action
that player i uses for comparison.
We consider that this reference-dependent measure is a natural way for player i to assess
player js actions, which is yet general enough to embed di¤erent behavioral models as spe-
cial cases, as this paper shows. In particular, this distance function is similar to that in the
literature on reference-dependent preferences, such as Köszegi and Rabin (2006). However,
their model analyzes individual decision making, unlike this paper where we examine the
strategic e¤ects of such reference-dependent preferences. On the other hand, our distance
function di¤ers from that in Rabin (1993) for simultaneous-move games and that in Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger (2004) for sequential-move games. Indeed, these studies assume that
player i compares his actual payo¤with respect to the equitablepayo¤ (his equitable share
in the Pareto-e¢ cient payo¤s). In contrast, we allow player i to compare player js actually
chosen action with respect to any feasible action, sRij (si; sj) 2 Sj, leading to equitable or
5Note that, for simplicity, we assume that player i compares player js actions, instead of the payo¤s
resulting from these action choices. Choosing the latter, however, would not modify our results, since player
is payo¤s are increasing in player js action choices (assumption A1). Hence, both a denition of kindness
based on the payo¤s that player i obtains from player js choices and a denition directly based on these
choices increase in player js action choices.
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non-equitable payo¤s. This greater generality in the reference point that player i uses for
comparison provides a rationalization for the experimental evidence presented in the intro-
duction. Let us next dene the concept of reference action, sRij (si; sj), which player i uses as
a reference point in order to evaluate the kindness that he perceives from player js actually
chosen action, sj.
Denition 1. Player is reference point function sRij : Si  Sj ! Sj, maps the pair
(si; sj) of both playersactually chosen actions, into a reference action s
Ri
j 2 Sj from player
js set of available choices. In addition, sRij (si; sj) is weakly increasing in si and sj, and
twice continuously di¤erentiable in si and sj.
Hence, player i can use any of player js available actions in Sj as a reference point.6
That is, sRij (si; sj) is allowed to be above/below/equal to player js actually chosen action, sj,
which leads to negative/positive/null distances, respectively. Obviously, the particular sign of
such distance a¤ects player is utility function, UCi (si; sj), as described above. Additionally,
note that when both playersstrategy spaces are identical, Si = Sj = S, player is reference
point function becomes sRij : S
2 ! S. In this context, the reference point function can be,
for instance, sRij (si; sj) = si for all sj. In such case, Di(si; sj) = i [sj   si], and player
i compares player js chosen action, sj, with respect to her own, si. In particular, note
two specic examples of this distance function. First, when i > 0, it may represent the
case that sj > si is interpreted by player i as a signal of player js kindness (e.g., her
commitment to contribute high donations to the public good), whereas sj < si is evaluated
by player i as a sign of unkindness by her opponent (e.g., free-riding). The second example
is related to players concerns for status acquisition. Particularly, when i < 0, player i
makes the same comparison, but introduces the outcome of Di(si; sj) into her utility function
negatively, i.e. Di(si; sj) =  i [sj   si] = i [si   sj] In these cases, player i may evaluate
sj > si negatively because the action space represents for example the consumption of a
given positional good that enhances social status, and that player i wants to acquire.
6For simplicity, we restrict the range of reference points to player js available choices, Sj . More generally,
sRij (si; sj) could take values outside Sj . We believe, however, that it is more natural to assume that player i
compares player js actions with respect to her foregone options than to actions which were not even available
to her.
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Furthermore, we allow player i to modify the reference action he uses to compare player
js actually chosen action, i.e., sRij (si; sj) is not restricted to be constant for all sj. In
particular, we only assume that, for a given increase in player js action, sj, the refer-
ence point that player i uses, sRij (si; sj), does not increase as fast as player js action,
i.e., 1  @sRij (si; sj) =@sj. Intuitively, this condition makes higher values of player js ac-
tion meaningful for player i, since they increase the outcome of his distance function, i.e.,
@Di(si; sj)=@sj = 1   @sRij (si; sj) =@sj; and as we described above, positive distances ulti-
mately raise player is utility level (kindness). As a remark, note that Di (si; sj) does not
depend on any possible randomness over payo¤s. Indeed, player is utility level does not
depend on the di¤erence between payo¤s he could have received from the outcomes of a
certain lottery, but only on payo¤s he could have obtained from alternative choices of the
other players. This distinction di¤erentiates our approach from regret theory, as in Loomes
and Sugden (1982), since our model focuses on agent is evaluation of other playerschosen
and unchosen actions as a measure of their kindness. Finally, extending assumption A2 to
the context of concerned players, we assume that UCi (si; sj) is also strictly concave in all
player is action, si.
4.3.3 Best response function
The previous section described the structure behind playerspreferences, how they evaluate
the kindness behind other playersactions, and how this kindness enters into their utility
function. In this section, we turn to examine playersbest response function in these games.
Let sCi (sj) 2 argmax
si
UCi (si; sj) denote player is best response function when he assigns a
positive importance to player js foregone options, and sNCi (sj) 2 argmax
si
UNCi (si; sj) his
best response function when he does not. Let us next analyze the slope of player is best
response function.
Lemma 1. The slope of player is best response function when he is concerned about
foregone options, sCi (sj), is higher than that when he is not, s
NC
i (sj). That is,
@sCi (sj)
@sj
 @s
NC
i (sj)
@sj
for any sj 2 Sj (4.4)
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That is, when player i assigns a positive importance to foregone options he is more
sensitive to increases in player js actions than when he does not. In addition to being
more sensitive, the next proposition shows that in fact he actually responds more (less)
cooperatively when he perceives kindness (unkindness) from player js actions compared to
how he would react in the case of being unconcerned about player js unchosen alternatives.
Proposition 1. Player is best response function when he is concerned about foregone
options is higher than that when he is not if player i infers kindness from player js actions;
and lower if he infers unkindness. That is,
sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj) for all sj such that Di (si; sj)  0
sCi (sj) < s
NC
i (sj) for all sj such that Di (si; sj) < 0
Intuitively, player i (when concerned about player js foregone options) responds more
cooperatively to what he perceives as kind actions, Di (si; sj)  0, than when he is uncon-
cerned, i.e., sCi (sj) > s
NC
i (sj). The opposite happens when he interprets that player js
actions are unkind, i.e., sCi (sj) < s
NC
i (sj). In other words, his interpretation of kind (or un-
kind) actions triggers a higher (lower) response when he is concerned about foregone options
than when he is not. For example, the worker in the labor market gift exchange game, when
perceiving kind actions from the rm manager, exerts a higher e¤ort when he is concerned
about the rm managers unchosen alternatives (foregone wage o¤ers) than when he is not,
and a lower e¤ort otherwise.
4.4 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Recall that player j represents the rst mover in this complete information sequential-move
game, and player i denotes the second mover. Note that player is best response function,
sCi (sj), in the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game was already described in the above
lemma 1 and proposition 1. Let us now analyze player js (rst mover) equilibrium action
in this sequential game.
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Lemma 2. The leaders marginal utility from increasing her own action sj is higher
when the follower is concerned about her unchosen alternatives than when he is not. That
is, for any action sj 2 Sj player js (rst mover) utility function satises,
@UNCj
 
sCi (sj) ; sj

@sj
 @U
NC
j
 
sNCi (sj) ; sj

@sj
(4.5)
From this lemma, the following proposition is immediately derived.
Proposition 2. If assumptions A1-A5 are satised, then sCj  sNCj . That is, the leaders
equilibrium strategy when dealing with a follower who is concerned about foregone options,
sCj , is weakly higher than her equilibrium strategy when facing a follower not concerned about
foregone options, sNCj .
Hence, in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy prole of the game with positive
concerns for foregone options the leader chooses a higher equilibrium action than that in the
game with no concerns for unchosen alternatives.7 This result is especially relevant for certain
games, such as the labor market gift exchange and the sequential public good game, where
the introduction of concerns for foregone options leads to higher levels of cooperation among
the players. In particular, as we show in section 5 for di¤erent economic applications, the
fact that the follower is sensitive to the leaders unchosen alternatives attenuates the leaders
incentives to shift most of the burden to the follower (reducing free-riding) which ultimately
triggers higher actions from her than in standard game-theoretic models.8 Furthermore, the
prole of actions that players choose in equilibrium, as we also show in section 5, can better
rationalize experimental results of playersobserved behavior.
7As a remark, note that the follower moves his action choice in the opposite direction than the rst
mover moves her when he regards actions as strategic substitutes (negatively sloped best response function);
whereas he moves it in the same direction when actions are strategic complements (positively sloped best
response function).
8These results can be easily generalized to sequential-move games with N players. In such settings,
every player measures the kindness he infers from the actually chosen strategies of every player who played
before him. The outcome of each of these individual comparisons can then be added up (or even scaled in
a weighted average), in order to evaluate player is distance function. Despite the greater generality of such
model, nonetheless, its results and intuition are already captured by the two-player setting we consider in
this paper.
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4.4.1 Remarks on inequity aversion and reciprocity
In this paper we analyze how the consideration of foregone options a¤ects playersequilibrium
strategies. Nonetheless, in this subsection, we show that (under certain conditions) our
model can also support the results of the literature on inequity aversion and intentions-
based reciprocity as special cases.
Proposition 3. Assume sRij (si; sj) = si for all sj. Then, player is preferences can be
represented as a weighted average of her material payo¤s and those of player j.
UCi (si; sj) = iU
NC
i (si; sj) + jU
NC
j (sj; si) where i; j 2 R (4.6)
In particular, the above proposition uses Segal and Sobels (1999) results to specify that,
when player i compares player js actually chosen action, sj, with that chosen by herself,
si, her utility function UCi (si; sj) can be represented as an (additively separable) weighted
average of both playersmaterial payo¤s. Therefore, in such context our model captures
players concerns for inequity aversion (or altruism) as a special case. In addition, this
model also captures the literature on intentions-based reciprocity as a special case. Indeed,
the above utility representation embodies Charness and Rabins (2002) model for the case
that player i infers misbehavior from player js actions, and for i = 1    and j =  .
That is,
UCi (si; sj) = (1  )UNCi (si; sj)  UNCj (sj; si) (4.7)
= UNCi (si; sj) + 

UNCi (si; sj)  UNCj (sj; si)

Therefore, when players use their own action si as a reference point to compare other
playersactually chosen action, sj, our model embeds both inequity aversion and intentions-
based reciprocity as special cases.9
9Clearly, this representation of player is utility function does not completely capture Charness and
Rabins (2002) model, since they analyze other facets of individualsbehavior, such as inequity aversion, in
addition to reciprocity. However, when restricted to intensions-based reciprocity alone, and when player i
infers misbehavior from player js actions, the above utility function coincides with that in Charness and
Rabin (2002).
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4.5 APPLICATIONS
4.5.1 Ultimatum bargaining game
Let us rst apply our model to the ultimatum bargaining game where a (female) proposer
j is called to choose how to divide a pie (of size normalized to one) between the (male)
responder i and herself, and the responder either accepts or rejects the division suggested
by the proposer, si 2 fA;Rg. In particular, let (sj; 1  sj) represent the actual division
o¤ered by player j, where sj denotes the share of the pie accruing to the responder (which
coincides with his payo¤, sj = xi), and let 1  sj be the remaining share of the pie that the
proposer keeps for herself (which coincides with the proposers payo¤, 1  sj = xj). Hence,
xi represents the o¤er that the proposer makes to the responder, and fi denotes the foregone
o¤er that the responder uses as a reference action, sRj . Specically, the responders utility
function we use is given by the following expression10, for any xi 2 [0; 1], and i  0,
UCi (si; sj) = sj + i
 
sj   sRj

= xi + i (xi   fi) (4.8)
Clearly, if xi > fi, the responder perceives kindness from the proposer, and gets his
utility level increased in the second term. This additional utility is, furthermore, increasing
in i, the parameter reecting the importance that the responder assigns to the distance
xi   fi. Intuitively, perceiving kind actions has greater e¤ects on a receiver who is highly
concerned about foregone options than on a receiver with small concerns about them. In
addition, when either i = 0 or xi = fi, the receivers utility function just coincides with his
utility when he is not concerned about the proposers foregone options. In contrast, when
xi < fi the second term becomes negative. Now, the responder gets his utility level decreased
from the unkindness he perceives from the proposers actual o¤er, since xi < fi. Next, we
check that the responders utility function satises all the assumptions we consider in the
previous section.
Lemma 3 UCi (si; sj) satises A1 through A5.
10Di¤erent functional forms for UCi (si; sj) satisfy assumptions A1 through A5, leading to the results
predicted in the previous section. Nonetheless, a simple expression is used here to emphasize intuition.
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We now introduce an example, in order to illustrate the main intuition behind the above
utility function. In particular, we focus on the comparison between those utility functions
analyzed in the literature and that suggested above, by using Brandts and Solà (2001)
experimental results.
Example 1
Let us take an ultimatum bargaining game where the proposer chooses among two alternative
divisions of the pie: (xi; xj) = (0:2; 0:8) versus (fi; fj) = (0:125; 0:875), where the aforementioned
experimental results observe an overall accepting behavior from the receiver, or (xi; xj) = (0:2; 0:8)
versus (fi; fj) = (0:875; 0:125), where the above experiments found several rejections. We rst
show that this pattern of rejections cannot be explained by Fehr and Schmidts (1999) model
on social preferences. When the receiver experiences inequity aversion, and the proposer o¤ers
(xi; xj) = (0:2; 0:8) instead of (fi; fj) = (0:125; 0:875), the receiver accepts if
xi imax fxj   xi; 0g imax fxi   xj; 0g=
0:2  imax f0:8  0:2; 0g= 0:2  0:6i> 0, if and only if i<1
3
While, in the case of receiving an o¤er (xi; xj) = (0:2; 0:8) instead of (fi; fj) = (0:875; 0:125)
the receiver rejects if
0:2  imax f0:8  0:2; 0g= 0:2  0:6i< 0, if and only if i>1
3
which is not possible. Hence, this pattern of rejections cannot be explained by inequity aversion.
Let us now apply these payo¤s to the utility function of the receiver with positive concerns
about foregone options. In the case of receiving o¤er (xi; xj) = (0:2; 0:8) instead of (fi; fj) =
(0:125; 0:875) the receiver accepts such o¤er if 0:2 + i(0:2   0:125)= 0:2 0:075i> 0, i.e.,
i>  8=3, which is satised since i  0. Similarly, applying it to the case in which the pro-
poser o¤ers (xi; xj) = (0:2; 0:8) and foregoes (fi; fj) = (0:875; 0:125), the receiver rejects it if
0:2 + i(0:2  0:875)= 0:2 0:675i< 0, i.e., i> 0:29. Thus, this o¤er is rejected if and only if
the receivers concern about foregone options is su¢ ciently high, i > 0:29. N
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Hence, the above utility function is then able to explain why an individualistic responder
 who has no concerns about social payo¤s accepts an o¤er when it is associated to
kindness from the proposer, xi > fi, but can reject this same o¤er when he evaluates it
as a signal of unkindness. From the above utility function, we obtain the following result,
describing the responder acceptance rule in this example.
Lemma 4. In the ultimatum bargaining game with a responder who assigns a weight
i  0 to the proposers foregone divisions of the pie, fi, the responder accepts any o¤er xi
if and only if xi > xi, where xi = i1+ifi.
Let us emphasize some interesting insights from the above lemma, illustrated in gure
6 below. Clearly, when i = 0 the responders acceptance rule collapses to xi = 0. Indeed,
when the responder does not assign any weight to the proposers unchosen actions, then
any positive division of the pie is accepted by the responder, as in standard ultimatum
bargaining games. Furthermore, the responders acceptance threshold xi is increasing in i,
the importance he associates to the proposers unchosen alternatives, i.e., he becomes more
demanding in i. Finally, xi is increasing in fi, the receivers foregone option (represented
by an upward shift in the gure). Thus, the more demanding the receiver becomes (higher
fi) the more the proposer must o¤er him to induce his acceptance. Importantly, note that
the minimum division that the receiver accepts, xi, is smaller than one (the total size of the
pie) for any parameter values. Hence, xi leaves some strictly positive portion of the pie to
the proposer even when the receiver is extremely demanding (high i and fi).
Figure 6: Lemma 4
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Intuitively, the above acceptance rule of the responder shows that now the responder is
not going to accept any positive o¤er, as the standard ultimatum bargaining game predicts
when no concerns about the proposers foregone options are considered. This fact clearly
a¤ects the proposers optimal strategies. Certainly, if the proposer wants to obtain any
positive payo¤ from the game, she must make an o¤er which is accepted by the responder,
as we show below.
Proposition 4. In the ultimatum bargaining game where the responder assigns an
importance of i  0 to the options that the proposer forwent, the following strategy prole
describes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential game.
Responder accepts any o¤er xi such that xi > xi, where xi = i1+ifi.
Proposer o¤ers xi =
i
1+i
fi, for any parameter values.
Unlike models where the receiver is not concerned about foregone options  where the
proposer keeps the entire pie for himself the distribution of equilibrium payo¤s when the
receiver assigns a positive importance to foregone options is less unequal, as the following
corollary species.
Corollary 1. The distribution of equilibrium payo¤s in the ultimatum bargaining game
where the responder assigns importance i to the proposers foregone option, fi, is
(xi; xj) =

i
1 + i
fi; 1  i
1 + i
fi

(4.9)
Indeed, note that this distribution of payo¤s is more egalitarian than that of models where
the receiver is not concerned about foregone options, (xi; xj) = (0; 1), for any parameter
values. Hence, by considering the proposers foregone options into the responders utility
function we obtain higher degrees of fairness in the equilibrium payo¤s, as well as higher
cooperation between the players.
Let us nally relate our theoretical results with those of the experimental literature.
In particular, Falk et al. (2003) and Brandts and Solà (2001) show the existence of a
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relationship between the receivers acceptance threshold and the particular foregone o¤er
that the proposer did not make. Indeed, both of these studies show that, conditional on
o¤er (xi; xj) = (0:2; 0:8) being made, the acceptance rate increases in the distance between
the proposers chosen and unchosen alternatives, as the following gures illustrate.
In particular, note that the rst column of gure 7, where xi   fi = 0:2   0:5 =  0:3,
represents a negative distance between the proposers actual and foregone o¤er, from which
the receiver infers unkindness.On the other hand, column 3, where xi  fi = 0:2  0 = 0:2
(and the distance is positive) denotes the case in which the receiver interprets kindness
from the proposers o¤er, since she could have o¤ered him less than she actually did. Finally,
column 2 illustrates the case in which the proposer has no degree of freedom in choosing
her particular o¤er to the receiver. i.e., the proposers o¤er is (0.2,0.8) and her alternative
is also (0.2,0.8). In this case, the outcome of the distance function is zero, what leads the
receiver to neither perceive kindnessnor unkindnessfrom the proposers actions.11
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Figure 7: Falk et al. (2003)
Interestingly, the fact that the acceptance rate in the second column is exactly higher
than when he perceives unkindness(column 1) but lower than when he infers kindness
11According to Falk et al. (2003), the small (but positive) percentage of rejections in this case can be
supported by players inequity aversion, since they might dislike the unequal payo¤ distribution resulting
from their acceptance of (0.2,0.8). The fact that the responder does not attribute any responsibility to the
proposer in settings where the latter does not have any choice to make has been extensively studied by
psychologists with the use of attribution theory; see Ross and Fletcher (1985).
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Figure 8: Brandts and Sola (2001)
(column 3) supports our results.12 A similar intuition is also applicable to Brandts and Solàs
(2001) results as gure 8 suggests. Hence, both of these studies conrm our theoretical
prediction about the proposers o¤er. Indeed, proposers are observed to make low o¤ers
when kindness can be inferred from such o¤ers (positive distances), and high o¤ers when
they are interpreted in terms of unkindness (negative distances).
4.5.2 Labor market gift exchange game
We now apply the above model to a labor market gift exchange game, where the proposer is
identied as a rm making a wage o¤er to a worker, who decides what level of e¤ort to exert.
In traditional models without considerations about unchosen options, since e¤ort is costly
and the worker is the last player to move, the workers equilibrium strategy (in the subgame
where the worker is called to move) is to exert zero e¤ort regardless of the actual wage
o¤er made by the rm. Operating by backwards induction, the subgame perfect equilibrium
of this game predicts that the rm o¤ers the lowest possible wage and that workers exert
zero e¤ort for any wage o¤ered. These models, although theoretically simple, have found
very limited experimental evidence. Indeed, Fehr and Gachter (2000) summarize a series
12Despite the regularity of their results (acceptance rates which increase in the outcome of the distance
function), both of these studies report relatively high acceptance rates when distances are highly negative.
Nonetheless, such acceptance rates are still lower than in the case of positive distances.
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of experiments on labor markets where they conrm the existence of a positive correlation
between the wage o¤ered by the rm and the e¤ort exerted by the worker.
We next suggest a utility function that satises the properties considered in section 3
and that can better rationalize the above experimental results. As in previous sections, we
assume that the rm chooses a wage o¤er xi 2 [0; 1] to the worker. Similarly, let fi 2 [0; 1]
represent the foregone wage o¤er that the worker uses (sRj ) as a comparison against the actual
wage o¤er xi. In particular, let us consider the following utility function for the worker.
UCi (si; sj) = sj   e2 + i(sj   sRij )e = xi   e2 + i(xi   fi)e (4.10)
The above utility function coincides with the standard utility function of a worker who
exerts costly e¤ort when the parameter denoting the importance of foregone options, i,
approaches zero. The third term represents the relevance of the foregone options for the
worker, i.e., the wage o¤ers that the rm did not make when proposing the actual o¤er
xi. Note that when the foregone wage proposal is higher than the actual wage o¤ered,
xi < fi, then this third term becomes negative, and the worker experiences a disutility from
each unit of additional e¤ort exerted. Similarly, when xi > fi, this third term becomes
positive, and the worker interprets that the intentions of the rm are cooperative. That is,
the worker observes that the rm o¤ered a wage level which is above its foregone option,
which in turn increases the workers utility since he feels treated generously. In particular,
this utility function for the worker satises all the assumptions we considered in section 3,
as the following lemma species.
Lemma 5. UCi (si; sj) satises A1 through A5.
Intuitively, we should expect that, for proposals with a foregone option below the actual
o¤er, the worker should feel pleased by the kindness of the rm, and responds by exerting
a positive level of e¤ort, in contrast to the standard game-theoretic model. These intuitions
are conrmed in the following lemma.
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Lemma 6. In the gift exchange game where the worker assigns a value i to the distance
between the rms actual wage o¤er and its forgone alternative, the workers optimal e¤ort
level (in the subgame induced after the wage proposal) is given by
e (xi) = max

1
2
i (xi   fi) ; 0

(4.11)
This optimal e¤ort level is then positive if and only if the wage o¤er xi is above the
comparative foregone option, xi > fi, for any positive weight to foregone options, i. In
addition, an increase in the relative importance that the worker assigns to foregone options
increases his optimal e¤ort level, i.e., e (xi) weakly increases in i. On the other hand, for
a given weight on foregone options, i, and for a given wage o¤er xi, optimal e¤ort e (xi)
increases as the comparative foregone option fi decreases. Indeed, if the worker compares
the actual wage he receives, xi, with respect to the worst wage o¤er that the rm manager
could ever pay him (e.g., the legal minimum wage), he is easily pleased by many positive
wage o¤ers. On the contrary, a worker who compares his relative position with respect to
the best wage o¤er that the rm could a¤ord to pay him certainly evaluates most of the
wage o¤ers he receives as a signal of unkindness from the rm manager.
e(xi)
xifi
eC(xi)
for ai
eNC(xi)
eC(xi)
for a’i
0.5a i
0.5a i’
Figure 9: An increase in alpha i
This optimal e¤ort level is illustrated in gures 9 and 10, which include in addition, the
workers e¤ort level eNC (xi) in the case of assigning no importance to foregone options. Note
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Figure 10: A decrease in fi.
that eNC (xi) is at at zero for all xi, since the worker exerts no e¤ort for all wage o¤ers. In
both gures, the worker concerned about foregone options exerts positive e¤orts as long as
xi > fi for any positive weight on foregone options.13 On the one hand, gure 9 indicates
how the worker e¤ort pivots upward  with center at xi = fi when his concerns i about
the rmsunchosen alternatives increase. On the other hand, gure 10 represents how the
worker e¤ort shifts upwards when the rms unchosen alternative decreases (leftward shift
in the horizontal intercept).
Interestingly, these results are not only supported by the aforementioned experimental
evidence, but also by recent empirical work. In particular, Mas (2006) shows that police
arrest rates and average sentence length decline (and crime reports raise) when the wage
increase that police unions obtain is lower than their wage demands, relative to when it is
higher. Hence, police union wage demands would work as the reference point which they use
in their negotiations for higher salaries with government o¢ cials.
Given the above optimal e¤ort function, and operating by backwards induction, we can
nd the rms optimal wage o¤er. Specically, we assume the following (standard) utility
13Note that our results in the labor market gift exchange game are similar to those in Akerlof (1982) since
higher salaries induce higher e¤ort levels. In particular, Akerlofs (1982) results are a special case of ours.
when the foregone wage o¤er is exactly xed at the fair wagelevel.
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function for the rm, V (sj; si) = (v   xi) e, where v represents the constant productivity of
e¤ort (e.g., how workers e¤ort is transformed into nal output); and xi denotes, as above,
the actual wage o¤er made to the worker. Moreover, v > 1, since the productivity of e¤ort is
assumed to be higher than any of the wage o¤ers, xi 2 [0; 1]. Inserting the workers optimal
e¤ort function found above, and manipulating, we nd the optimal o¤er made by the rm.
Proposition 5. In the gift exchange game where the worker assigns an importance of i
to the distance between the wage o¤er foregone by the rm and its actual o¤er, the subgame
perfect equilibrium strategies are the following
Firm o¤ers
xi =
v + fi(x

i )
2
(4.12)
Worker accepts any o¤er xi such that xi > 0. In addition, the worker exerts an e¤ort
level of
e (xi) = max

1
2
i (xi   fi(xi)) ; 0

(4.13)
As the above proposition species, the rms optimal o¤er xi is higher than the workers
foregone option, fi(xi ), since v > 1. In addition, x

i is increasing in the foregone option,
fi(x

i ), that the receiver uses to make the comparison with respect
14 to xi . In the standard
models where concerns for foregone options are not considered, the subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the game predicts that the worker exerts no positive e¤ort for any wage o¤er, and
the rm, anticipating the workers move, o¤ers the lowest possible wage. In contrast, in the
above environment including the importance of the foregone wage o¤ers for the worker, we
found that the rm makes a positive wage o¤er, since this o¤er can induce a higher level of
exerted e¤ort from the worker. That is, by showing kindness in high wage o¤ers, the rm
pleases the worker enough to induce him to exert higher e¤orts.
Clearly, the above equilibrium predictions are closer to the actual experimental results
observed in the literature, Fehr and Gachter (2000), which nd a positive correlation between
14Note that, for simplicity, we assume that the worker compares all wage o¤ers with respect to the same
foregone option, i.e., f 0(xi ) = 0. Similar results are nonetheless applicable for the more general case in which
f 0(xi ) 6= 0, and they are included in the proof of proposition 5 at the appendix.
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the wage o¤ered by the rm and the exerted e¤ort levels from the worker. Many authors have
rationalized the above ndings by using the e¢ ciency wage theory arguments. That is, if a
worker is paid above the minimum wage, he has a greater opportunity cost of shirking, which
induces him to work harder, and to exert e¤ort levels that are increasing in his wage o¤er.
This paper may thus complement this rationalization of the experimental results through
e¢ ciency wage theory. Nonetheless, the model we presented above can explain cooperative
behavior between employers and workers in the labor market without relying on the workers
opportunity cost of shirking, or his outside options if he is red.
Finally, these results also provide an interesting explanation for the existence of wage
di¤erentials across industries. Indeed, as Krueger and Summers (1988) show, industry wage
di¤erentials are signicant even after controlling for individual characteristics and rm qual-
ity; which suggests that these di¤erentials are not just due to unobserved di¤erences in
labor quality. Our model then rationalizes this result by predicting that rmsequilibrium
wage o¤er, after controlling for workers productivity, may vary depending on the particular
reference point that each worker uses for comparison.
4.5.3 Sequential public good game
The third game where we introduce the importance of the proposers foregone options is
the sequential public good game (PGG thereafter). Specically, we consider a sequential
solicitation game where a rst mover is asked to submit a donation, sj 2 [0; 1], for the
provision of a public good, and observing her donation, a follower decides which is the
contribution, si 2 [0; 1], he makes. In order to be consistent with the games dened above,
the leader is assumed to not assign any weight to the followers unchosen actions. In contrast,
the follower assigns a relevance i to a specic contribution that the leader forwent, and that
the follower uses as a reference point for comparison (reference action, sRj ). In particular,
leader and followers utility functions are, respectively
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UNCj (sj; si) = zj + [m (si + sj)]
0:5
UCi (si; sj) = zi +

m (si + sj)

1 + i
 
sj   sRj
0:5
(4.14)
Both of these functions are quasilinear in the private good, z, and their nonlinear part
takes into account the utility derived from the total public good provisionG = si+sj (relevant
for both players) and the distance i
 
sj   sRj

, which is only relevant for the follower. For
simplicity, let us assume in this application that the follower uses the same reference action
sRj for all action choices of the leader. Finally, m  0 denotes the return every player obtains
from total contributions to the public good. Interestingly, note how foregone options are
introduced into the followers utility function. When the relevance he assigns to the leaders
unchosen alternatives approaches zero, i = 0, the follower only cares about the private
and public good consumption. However, when he assigns a positive importance to foregone
options, he experiences a higher utility from contributing to the public good when the leaders
contribution is higher than the foregone option, sj > sRj , or a lower utility otherwise, sj < s
R
j .
In addition, this utility function satises all the assumptions we consider in section 3, as the
following lemma states.
Lemma 7. UCi (si; sj) satises A1 through A5.
Since we are discussing a sequential game where the follower decides how much to give
out of a continuous strategy choice, the second mover best response function is easily found
by solving the followers utility maximization problem. We summarize this result in the
following lemma.
Lemma 8. In the sequential PGG, where the follower assigns weight i to the distance
between the leaders actual contribution, sj, and the foregone contribution, sRj , the followers
best response function sCi (sj) is given by
sCi (sj) =
8><>:
m(1 isRj )
4
   1 + im
4

sj if sj 2

0;
m(1 isRj )
4 im

0 if sj  m(1 is
R
j )
4 im
(4.15)
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Figure 11 compares the second movers best response function when he is concerned
about foregone options, sCi (sj), and when he is not, s
NC
i (sj):
si
sj
sNCi(sj)
sCi(sj)
sjR
sj<sjR sj>sjR
4
m
( )
4
1 Rjism a+
Figure 11: Comparing sCi (sj) and s
NC
i (sj)
Specically, note that the introduction of the importance of foregone options into the sec-
ond movers utility function makes sCi (sj) to pivot counterclockwise with respect to s
NC
i (sj),
with center at sj = sRj , making s
C
i (sj) steeper than s
NC
i (sj). Hence, the second mover rel-
atively reciprocates the rst movers contributions, since he reduces his donation when
sj < s
R
j , but increases it when sj > s
R
j . After nding s
C
i (sj), and by sequential rationality,
we can now nd the rst movers equilibrium contribution in this game.
Lemma 9. In the sequential PGG, where the follower assigns a weight i to the leaders
foregone options, the leaders donation in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game
is
sj =
8<: 0 if i < i16(isRj  1)+2im2
16i
otherwise
(4.16)
where i = 1616sRj +m
Thus, the rst donor submits a zero contribution when the second donors concerns
for foregone options are low enough, i < i. Clearly, when i = 0 the rst donor also
80
submits a null donation, which coincides with the equilibrium prediction in standard PGGs.
However, when the second donors concerns for foregone options increase enough, i > i,
the rst mover is induced to submit positive contributions that can trigger further donations
from the second mover (given his reciprocating behavior described in the previous gure).
Additionally, note that as expected, the leaders contribution is increasing in the followers
concerns for foregone options, i, and in the foregone contribution that he uses as a reference
point for comparison, sRj .
Proposition 6. In the sequential PGG where the second mover assigns a weight i to
the rst movers unchosen alternatives, the following strategy prole describes the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game.
Proposer contributes
sj =
8<: 0 if i < i16(isRj  1)+2im2
16i
otherwise
(4.17)
And the second mover responds by contributing
sCi (sj) =
8><>:
m(1 isRj )
4
   1 + im
4

sj if sj 2

0;
m(1 isRj )
4 im

0 if sj  m(1 is
R
j )
4 im
(4.18)
Particularly, the above results specify that by having a second mover concerned about the
rst movers foregone options, the latter is induced to contribute (weakly) higher amounts
than those she would donate in the case of facing a responder with no concerns about her
unchosen alternatives. From a more general perspective, by introducing a follower con-
cerned about the leaders foregone options, we are able to obtain (weakly) higher levels of
cooperation in the public good provision.
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4.6 CONCLUSIONS
Di¤erent experimental papers, such as Brandts and Solà (2001), Falk et al. (2003), and
Andreoni et al. (2002), accumulate a signicant evidence about the importance of a players
unchosen alternatives on other playersactions. Foregone options, in particular, may work as
standards against which every individual evaluates the kindness of other players in the popu-
lation. Importantly, these studies suggest that arguments on social preferences alone cannot
explain their experimental results without complementing their approach by considering the
importance of a playersunchosen alternatives inside his opponentsutility function.
This paper examines a tractable theoretical model that introduces these unchosen alter-
natives into individualspreferences via a reference point. We rst analyze the equilibrium
prediction in complete information sequential-move games, and then compare it with that
of standard games where players are not concerned about unchosen alternatives. We show
that, without relying on interpersonal payo¤ comparisons (i.e., within strictly individual-
istic preferences), our model predicts higher levels of fairness in the resulting allocation,
as well as higher cooperation among the players, than standard game-theoretic models. In
addition, we demonstrate that this approach embeds as special cases many existing behav-
ioral models: from inequity aversion to intentions-based reciprocity. Therefore, this model
o¤ers a broader and more unifying explanation of agentsconduct than these models alone.
Furthermore, when applying our model to di¤erent sequential games, we obtain interesting
results. First, the equilibrium allocation in the ultimatum bargaining game is fairer than
that resulting from standard game-theoretic predictions. Second, workers e¤ort and rms
proposed wages are higher than in the usual labor market gift exchange model. Finally,
equilibrium donations in the sequential public good game are higher than the predictions for
standard models.
There are several natural extensions to the model introduced in this paper. First, it
would be interesting to experimentally test under which payo¤ structures we can rationalize
observed behavior using individualspreferences over equitable payo¤s, and in which envi-
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ronments human conduct is instead mainly explained by the playersstrictly individualistic
preferencessuggested in this paper. One direct test of the dominance of these two behav-
ioral motives is, for example, the following ultimatum bargaining game. The proposer is
allowed to make only two divisions of the pie, of size normalized to one. In the rst treat-
ment she can o¤er (0.4, 0.6), giving 0.4 to the responder and keeping 0.6 for herself, or the
equitable payo¤ (0.5, 0.5). In the second treatment, the rst division of the pie is xed in
(0.4, 0.6), but the second division is now (0.6, 0.4) instead. Note that, conditional on the rst
o¤er, (0.4, 0.6), being made, the distance between the actual o¤er, 0.4, and the alternative
o¤er is higher in the rst treatment, 0:4  0:5 =  0:1, than in the second, 0:4  0:6 =  0:2.
Hence, according to our equilibrium predictions, we should observe more rejections in the
second treatment than in the rst. However, if we observe higher percentage of rejections
in the rst than in the second treatment, it must be that responders in the rst treatment
evaluate the equitable payo¤s that the proposer did not select as a more desirable goal than
the higher individual payo¤ he could have received in the second treatment.
Second, in this paper the space of available alternatives was exogenously determined
before the beginning of the game. However, it would be interesting to allow players to
strategically select their available choices before the game starts, given that the kindness
other players perceive from their chosen actions depends on which available strategies are
not chosen. That is, by strategically selecting her set of available alternatives, a player
may achieve that other players infer a greater kindness from her actions. This strategic
selection of available choices is observed in di¤erent contexts, where a player uses one of
her unchosen alternatives as an excuse to support her actual choices, since the equilibrium
payo¤ associated with that particular unchosen action would have been certainly worse than
that from her chosen action. These extensions can certainly enhance our understanding of
the role of playersforegone options on their opponentsincentives, and how such incentives
can lead to higher degrees of cooperation from a strictly individualistic perspective.
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4.6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In this environmental game, both players are asked to simultaneously submit their investments in
emission-reducing technologies. Fixing country js investment, xj , country is utility maximization
problem becomes
max
xi
w   xi+ ln [m(xi + xj) + i (xi   ci)]
And the argument that maximizes this utility function gives us the following best response
function
xi(xj) =
8>>><>>>:
1
m+i
icj if xj = 0
1 + 1
m+i
[ici  mxj] if xj 2
i
0; i(1+ci)+m
m
h
0 if xj > i(1+ci)+mm
Since 1+ 1
m+i
[ici  mxj] = 0 exactly at xj = i(1+ci)+mm . Hence, this best response function
can be more compactly expressed as
xi(xj) =
8<: 1 +
1
m+i
[ici  mxj] if xj 2
h
0; i(1+ci)+m
m
h
0 if xj > i(1+ci)+mm
4.6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us take country is best response function, xi(xj), from lemma 1, and analyze the di¤erent
forms in which country i and js best response functions can cross each other. The corner solutions
(cases 1 and 2 ) are illustrated in gures 12 and 13, to clarify the following steps of the proof.
Case 1: xi = 0
Note that xi = 0 if and only the following two conditions are satised: (1) the horizontal
intercept of country is best response function is lower than that of country j, and (2) the slope
of country js best response function is small enough to make that xj(xi) does not cross xi(xj).
That is, the rst condition is satised if
i(1 + ci)
m
+ 1 <
jcj
j +m
+ 1
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Figure 12: Proposition 1. Case 1
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Figure 13: Proposition 1. Case 2
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Manipulating this inequality, we obtain
i <
jcjm
(1 + ci)(j +m)
On the other hand, the second condition holds if, b, the slope of country js best response
function, satises
0 < 1 +
jcj
m+ j
  b(1 + ici
m+ i
)
() b < [m+ j(1 + cj)][m+ i]
[m+ i(1 + ci)][m+ j]
and since the slope of xj(xi) is
m
j+m
, we need that
m
m+ j
<
[m+ j(1 + cj)][m+ i]
[m+ i(1 + ci)][m+ j]
[m+ i(1 + ci)][m+ j]m < [m+ j(1 + cj)][m+ i][m+ j]
and manipulating, and solving for i, we obtain the threshold of i below which all values of i
support a zero investment in clean technologies by country i,
i  mcj + j(1 + cj)(m+ cj)
(1 + ci)m
Case 2: xi = 1 +
ici
m+i
Let us now analyze the case in which country i sets the maximum investment (1 + ici
m+i
) ,
while country j does not invest. Firstly, we need that country is horizontal intercept is above that
of country js, what simply implies
i(1 + ci)
m
+ 1 >
jcj
j +m
+ 1() i > jcjm
(1 + ci)(j +m)
() i > jcjm
(1 + ci)(j +m)
= i(j)
Secondly, we need that b, the slope of country js best response function, satises
0 > 1 +
jcj +m
m+ j
  b(1 + ici
m+ i
)
and operating similarly as in the previous case, we have
i >
mcj + j(1 + cj)(m+ cj)
(1 + ci)m
= ^i(j)
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Case 3: xi =
i(1+ci)(j+m) jmcj
jm+i(j+m)
Finally, the equilibrium is interior when rst, country is horizontal intercept is below that of
country js, what simply implies,
i(1 + ci)
m
+ 1 <
jcj
j +m
+ 1() i < jcjm
(1 + ci)(j +m)
= i(j)
and second, when b, the slope of country js best response function, satises
0 > 1 +
jcj +m
m+ j
  b(1 + ici
m+ i
)() i > mcj + j(1 + cj)(m+ cj)
(1 + ci)m
= ^i(j)
Finally, we must check that i(j) > ^i(j). Indeed,
jcjm
(1 + ci)(j +m)
  mcj + j(1 + cj)(m+ cj)
(1 + ci)m
> 0
j >   m
(1 + cj)
Sincem and cj are positive this inequality holdsfor any parameter values. Hence, we can summarize
the above three cases as follows:
xi =
8>>><>>>:
1 + ici
m+i
if i > i(j)
i(1+ci)(j+m) jmcj
jm+i(j+m)
if i 2]^i(j); i(j)]
0 if i 2]0; ^i(j)]
where i(j) =
jcjm
(1+ci)(j+m)
and ^i(j) =
mcj+j(1+cj)(m+cj)
(1+ci)m
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4.6.3 Proof of Lemma 2
In order to obtain a higher investment level than in the case of unconcerned countries, we need to
show that the total sum of the optimal investment in clean technologies of country i and j is greater
than one. Notice that there are three possible combinations, which depend of the parameter i or
j.
xi xj
Case 1 i2]0; ^i(j)] j> j(i)
Case 2 i2]^i(j); i(j)] j2]^j(i); j(i)]
Case 3 i> i(j) j2]0; ^j(i)]
Case 1 and 3 are trivial because when i> i(j) in case 1 ( and j> j(i) in case 3) the
optimal investment is xi = 1+
ici
m+i
in case 1 and xj = 0 (x

j = 1 +
jcj
m+j
and xi= 0 in case3)
which clearly is greater than one.
In case 2 the optimal investments in clean technologies are xi =
i(1+ci)(j+m) jmcj
jm+i(j+m)
and
xj =
j(1+cj)(i+m) imci
im+j(i+m)
, therefore:
xi+x

j > 1
i(1 + ci)(j+m)  jmcj
jm+ i(j+m)
+
j(1 + cj)(i+m)  imci
im+ j(i+m)
> 1
jm+ i(m+ j(2 + ci+cj))
jm+ i(j+m)
> 1
ci+cj >  1
and given that ci and cj are positive numbers the above inequality holds.
Therefore the sum of the optimal investments in case 2 is greater than one
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4.6.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Di¤erentiating xi with respect to ci,
@xi
@ci
=
8>>><>>>:
i
m+i
if i > i(j)
i(j+m)
jm+i(j+m)
if i 2]^i(j); i(j)]
0 if i 2]0; ^i(j)]
which is positive for any parameter values. Similarly, di¤erentiating xi with respect to cj ,
@xi
@cj
=
8>>><>>>:
0 if i > i(j)
  jm
jm+i(j+m)
if i 2]^i(j); i(j)]
0 if i 2]0; ^i(j)]
which is negative for any parameter values.
4.6.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Di¤erentiating xi with respect to i,
@xi
@i
=
8>>><>>>:
cim
[i+m]
2 if i > i(j)
jm(ci+cj+1)(j+m)
[jm+i(j+m)]
2 if i 2]^i(j); i(j)]
0 if i 2]0; ^i(j)]
which is positive. Finally, let us di¤erentiate xi with respect to j ,
@xi
@j
=
8>>><>>>:
0 if i > i(j)
  im2(ci+cj+1)
[jm+i(j+m)]
2 if i 2]^i(j); i(j)]
0 if i 2]0; ^i(j)]
which is negative.
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4.6.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Inserting the results from proposition 1 for two countries with positive weight, i > 0 and j > 0,
we obtain country is equilibrium utility level from playing the subgame in which countries invest
in emission-reducing technologies.
Ui = w   xi + ln

m
 
xi + x

j

+ i (x

i   ci)

=  i(1 + ci)(j +m) + jcjm
jm+ i (j +m)
+ w   ln [i +m]
Since Ui is linear in both ci and cj , we can determine the value of ci and cj that maximizes Ui
by checking if Ui increases or decreases in ci and cj . Indeed,
@Ui
@ci
=   i(j +m)
jm+ i (j +m)
which is negative for all parameter values. In contrast,
@Ui
@cj
=
jm
jm+ i (j +m)
which is positive for all parameter values. Hence, Ui decreases in ci and increases in cj .
4.6.7 Proof of Proposition 3
In the ultimatum bargaining game country i makes an o¤er and country j can accept or reject such
o¤er. In the model there are 3 cases, since countries i and j can have di¤erent concern levels about
green voters. Specically, country i solves the following maximization problem:
Max
ci;cj
Ui(ci; cj)
s:t:Uj(ci; cj) = 0
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First case: Country is concern level is very high, i> i(j), and country js concern level
is small, j2]0; ^j(i)].
(ci ; c

j) = (
i( 1 +m+ i)
1 + i
;
ew(3i e
wm+mB + i(1 +m)B + 
2
i ( 1 + ewm2)
j(1 + i)(m+ i)
)
where B = ( 1 + ewm)
(xi ; x

j) = (
m+ i(1 +m+ i(m+ i))
(1 + i)(m+ i)
; 0)
Second case: Country i and j have a medium concern level, that is i2]^i(j); i(j)] and
j2]^j(i); j(i)].
ci 2 [0;
i( 1 + w) +m( 1 + 2w) + 	 log	 +m log  )
i
] and
cj 2 [
 ij + jm( 1 + w) + i w + (jm+ i ) log  
j	
;
j( 1 + w) +m( 1 + 2w) +   log   +m log	)
j
]
where   = (j+m) and 	 =(i+m)
xi 2 [
	 mw  m log  
	
; w + log	] and xj2 [
j(2	 mw  m log  )
jm+ i 
; w + log  ]
Third case: Country is concern level is very small, i2]0; ^i(j)], and country j is very
concerned about the noncompliance cost, j> j(i).
ci 2 [0;
e w( 1 + ewmw + ewm log[j +m])
i
] and cj=
(m+ j)( 1 + w + log[j +m])
j
xi = 0 and x

j2 [1; w + log[j +m])
Figure 14 depicts the relationship between countriesconcern levels and the main results ob-
tained in Proposition 3.
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Figure 14: Results proposition 3
4.6.7.1 Corollary 2 Case when country i proposes (ci ; c

j) and i> i(j) and j2]0; ^j(i)]:
(ci ; c

j) = (0;
ew( 1 + ewm)
j
)
(xi ; x

j) = (1; 0)
where ci =
i( 1 +m+ i)
1 + i
= 0 i¤ i 1 m
4.6.8 Corollary 3
Case when country i proposes (ci ; c

j) and i2]^i(j); i(j)] and j2]^j(i); j(i)]:
@cj
i
=
m2(w + log  )
j	2
> 0
@cj
i
=
m
j	
> 0
Case when country i proposes (ci ; c

j) and i> i(j) and j2]0; ^j(i)]:
@cj
@i
=
mi(
3
i+2( 1 +m)m+ 22i (1 +m) + i( 1 +m(3 +m)))
j(1 + i)2(m+ i)2
> 0, i¤m > 0
92
4.6.9 Corollary 4
The total investment in clean technology, G = xi+xj , obtained when countriesconcern level are
represented by i2]^i(j); i(j)] and j2]^j(i); j(i)] is:
G = xi+x

j= 2w + log   + log	
@G
@j
=
1
(j+m)
> 0
@G
@i
=
1
(i+m)
> 0
4.6.10 Proof of Lemma 5
In this environmental game, both players are asked to simultaneously submit their investments in
emission-reducing technologies. Fixing country js investment, xj , country is utility maximization
problem becomes
max
xi
w   xi+ ln [m(xi + xj) + i (xj   cj)]
And the argument that maximizes this utility function gives us the following best response
function
xi(xj) =
8>>><>>>:
1
m
[icj +m] if xj = 0
1
m
[icj +m  (i +m)xj] if xj 2
i
0;
icj+m
i+m
h
0 if xj > icj+mi+m
Since 1
m
[icj +m  (i +m)xj] = 0 exactly at xj = icj+mi+m . Hence, this best response
function can be more compactly expressed as
xi(xj) =
8<:
1
m
[icj +m  (i +m)xj] if xj 2
h
0;
icj+m
i+m
h
0 if xj > icj+mi+m
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4.6.11 Proof of Proposition 4
Let us take country is best response function, xi(xj), from lemma 1, and analyze the di¤erent
forms in which country i and js best response functions can cross each other. The corner solutions
(cases 1 and 2 below) are illustrated in gures 15 and 16, to clarify the following steps of the proof.
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Figure 15: Proposition 4. Case 1
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Figure 16: Proposition 4. Case 2
Case 1: xi = 0
Note that xi = 0 if and only the following two conditions are satised: (1) the horizontal
intercept of country is best response function is lower than that of country j., and (2) the slope
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of country js best response function is small enough to make that xj(xi) does not cross xi(xj).
That is, the rst condition is satised if
icj +m
i +m
<
jci +m
m
Manipulating this inequality, we obtain
i <
jcim
m (cj   1)  jci
and since ci  1 by denition, the term in the right-hand side is negative for any ci < 1, what
implies that the above inequality is always satised for any i = 0.
On the other hand, the second condition holds if, b, the slope of country js best response
function, satises
0 <
jci +m
m
  bicj +m
m
() b < jci +m
icj +m
and since the slope of xj(xi) is j +m, we need that
 (j +m) >  

jci +m
icj +m

(j +m) <
jci +m
icj +m
and manipulating, and solving for i, we obtain the threshold of i below which all values of i
support a zero investment in clean technologies by country i,
i <
j(ci  m) +m m2
cj(j +m)
= i(j)
Case 2: xi =
icj+m
m
Let us now analyze the case in which country i sets the maximum investment icj+m
m
, while
country j does not invest. Firstly, we need that country is horizontal intercept is above that of
country js, what simply implies
icj +m
i +m
>
jci +m
m
() i > jcim
m (cj   1)  jci
() i > jcim
m (cj   1)  jci = ^i(j)
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Secondly, we need that b, the slope of country js best response function, satises
0 >
jci +m
m
  bicj +m
m
and operating similarly as in the previous case, we have
i >
j(ci  m) +m m2
cj(j +m)
= i(j)
Case 3: xi =
jcim+i(jci+m cjm)
jm+i(j+m)
Finally, the equilibrium is interior when rst, country is horizontal intercept is below that of
country js, what simply implies,
icj +m
i +m
>
jci +m
m
() i < jcim
m (cj   1)  jci = ^i(j)
and second, when b, the slope of country js best response function, satises
0 >
jci +m
m
+ b
icj +m
m
() i > j(ci  m) +m m
2
cj(j +m)
= i(j)
Finally, we must check that i(j) > ^i(j). Indeed,
i(j)  ^i(j) =
j(ci  m) +m m2
cj(j +m)
  jcim
m (cj   1)  jci > 0
for any parameter values. Hence, we can summarize the above three cases as follows:
xi =
8>>><>>>:
icj+m
m
if i > i(j)
jcim+i(jci+m cjm)
jm+i(j+m)
if i 2]^i(j); i(j)]
0 if i 2]0; ^i(j)]
where ^i(j) =
jcim
m(cj 1) jci and i(j) =
j(ci m)+m m2
cj(j+m)
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4.6.12 Proof of Lemma 6
In order to obtain a higher solution than in the case of unconcerned countries (standard public
good games), we need to show that the total sum of the optimal investment in clean technologies of
the country i and j is greater than one. Notice that there are three possible combinations, which
depend of the parameter i or j.
xi xj
Case 1 i> i(j) j2]0; ^j(i)]
Case 2 i2]^i(j); i(j)] j2]^j(i); j(i)]
Case 3 i2]0; ^i(j)] j> j(i)
Case 1 and 3 are trivial because when i> i(j) or j> j(i) the optimal investment is
xi= 1+
icj
m
( or xj= 1+
jci
m
) which is greater than one.
In case 2 the optimal investments in clean technologies are xi =
jcim+i(jci+m cjm)
jm+i(j+m)
and
xj =
icjm+j(icj+m cim)
im+j(i+m)
, therefore:
xi+x

j > 1
jcim+ i (jci+m  cjm)
jm+ i (j+m)
+
icjm+ j (icj +m  cim)
im+ j (i +m)
> 1
jm+ i(m+ j(ci+cj))
jm+ i(j+m)
> 1
ci+cj > 1
Therefore, the total sum of optimal investment in clean technologies is greater than one if and
only if ci+cj> 1.
4.6.13 Proof of Lemma 7
Di¤erentiating xi with respect to ci,
@xi
@ci
=
8>>><>>>:
0 if i > i(j)
j(i+m)
jm+i(j+m)
if i 2]^i(j); i(j)]
0 if i 2]0; ^i(j)]
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which is positive for any parameter values. Similarly, di¤erentiating xi with respect to cj ,
@xi
@cj
=
8>>><>>>:
i
m
if i > i(j)
  im
jm+i(j+m)
if i 2]^i(j); i(j)]
0 if i 2]0; ^i(j)]
which is negative for i 2]^i(j); i(j)].
4.6.14 Proof of Lemma 8
Di¤erentiating xi with respect to i,
@xi
@i
=
8>>><>>>:
cj
m
if i > i(j)
  j(ci+cj 1)m2
[jm+i(j+m)]
2 if i 2]^i(j); i(j)]
0 if i 2]0; ^i(j)]
which is negative if and only if ci + cj > 1. Finally, let us di¤erentiate xi with respect to j ,
@xi
@j
=
8>>><>>>:
0 if i > i(j)
i(ci+cj 1)m(i+m)
[jm+i(j+m)]
2 if i 2]^i(j); i(j)]
0 if i 2]0; ^i(j)]
which is positive if and only if ci + cj > 1.
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4.6.15 Proof of Proposition 5
Inserting the results from proposition 1 for two countries with positive weight, i > 0 and j > 0,
we obtain country is equilibrium utility level from playing the subgame in which countries invest
in emission-reducing technologies.
Ui = w   xi + ln

m
 
xi + x

j

+ i
 
xj   cj

=  jcim+ i (jci +m  cjm)
jm+ i (j +m)
+ w   ln [m]
Since Ui is linear in both ci and cj , we can determine the value of ci and cj that maximizes Ui
by checking if Ui increases or decreases in ci and cj . Indeed,
@Ui
@ci
=   ij + jm
jm+ i (j +m)
which is negative for all parameter values. In contrast,
@Ui
@cj
=
im
jm+ i (j +m)
which is positive for all parameter values. Hence, Ui decreases in ci and increases in cj .
4.6.16 Proof of Proposition 6
In the ultimatum bargaining game country i makes an o¤er and country j can accept or reject
such o¤er. In the model there are 3 cases, since countries i and j can have di¤erent concern levels
about green voters. Specically, country i solves the following maximization problem:
Max
ci;cj
Ui(ci; cj)
s:t:Uj(ci; cj) = 0
99
First case: Country is concern level is very high, i> i(j), and country js concern level
is small, j2]0; ^j(i)].
(ci ; c

j) = (
e w(m  im+ ew (2i+( 1 + i+2i )m))
( 1 + i)jm
;
i(1 +m)
( 1 + i)
)
where   = (j+m)
(xi ; x

j) = (0;
jmcj+m +
q
42j 
2+m2(   jcj)2
2mj 
)
Second case: Country i and j have a medium concern level, that is i2]^i(j); i(j)] and
j2]^j(i); j(i)].
ci 2 [0;
jw +m( 1 + 2w) +  logm)
j
] and
cj 2 [
 jm+ imw + j	w + (jm+ i ) logm)
i 
;
iw +m( 1 + 2w) + ' logm)
i
]
where   = (j+m); 	 = (i+m); =(j+2m) and ' = (i+2m)
xi 2 [
m mw  m logm
 
; w + logm] and xj2 [
 m2 +  'w +  ' logm
jm+ i 
; w + logm]
Third case: Country is concern level is very small, i2]0; ^i(j)], and country j is very
concerned about the noncompliance cost, j> j(i).The solution is undened given that the
models payo¤ structure is not well-behaved.
100
Parties Annex I Non- comm itm ent % Change 1990-2004 Compliance (1) Representatives green parties % (2)
Austra lia -108 25.1 No 5%
Austria -92 15.7 No 11%
Belg ium -92 1.4 No 3%
Belarus*** -92 -41.6 45% 2%
Bulgaria* ** -92 -49.0 53% 34%
Canada -94 26.6 No 0%
Croatia* ** -95 -5 .4 6% 0%
Czech Republic* ** -92 -25.0 27% 3%
Denmark -92 -1 .1 1% 3%
Eston ia* ** -92 -51.0 55% 1%
Europ ean Community -92 -0 .6 1% 5%
Fin land -92 14.5 No 7%
France -92 -0 .8 1% 0.54%
Germany** -92 -17.2 19% 8.31%
Greece -92 26.6 No 0%
Hungary* ** -94 -31.8 34% 0%
Iceland** -110 -5 .0 5% 8%
Ireland -92 23.1 No 0%
Italy -92 12.1 No 3%
Japan -94 6.5 No 0%
Latvia* ** -92 -58.8 64% 12%
Liechtenstein -92 18.5 No 12%
Lithuania* ** -92 -60.4 66% 0
Luxembourg -92 0.3 No 12%
Monaco -92 -3 .1 3% 0%
Netherlands -92 2.4 No 5%
New Zealand -100 21.3 No 3%
Norway -101 10.3 No 0%
Poland* ** -94 -31.2 33% 0%
Table 3: Green parties and countriescompliance -1st table
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Parties Annex I Non-comm itm ent % Change 1990 -2004 Compliance (1) Representatives green parties % (2)
Portugal -92 41 No 1%
Romania* ** -92 -41 45% 9%
Russian Federation* * -100 -32 32% 0%
Slovakia* ** -92 -30.4 33% 0%
Sloven ia* -92 -0 .8 1% 0%
Spain -92 49 No 0%
Sweden -92 -3 .5 4% 5%
Sw itzerland -92 0.4 No 1%
Turkey *** -92 72.6 No 0%
Ukraine* ** -100 -55.3 55% 0%
United K ingdom of G reat** -92 -14.3 16% 0%
United States of America -93 15.8 No 0%
Table 4: Green parties and countriescompliance -2nd table
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4.7 APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 2
4.7.1 Proof of incentive compatibility constraint (2)
From Branco (1997)
Let us assume that landholder i announces ei when his true type is i, and all the other
landholders truthfully reveal their private types
ui(ei; i) = ti(ei)  Ci(Bi(ei); ) (a)
and therefore the following holds
Ui(i) = ui(i; i) (b)
Moreover, we know that a necessary condition for incentive compatibility is
"
dti(ei)
dei
#
ei=i
=
"
@Ci(Bi(ei); )
@ei
#
ei=i
(c)
from (a), (b) and (c), and using the envelope theorem we can have a simple characterization
of incentive compatibility as
dUi(i)
di
=  @Ci(Bi(); )
@i
(d)
Therefore from the former expression we can write landholder i0s utility as
Ui (i) = U

i () 
iZ

Ci(Bi(x); x)
@i
dx 8i2

; 

(e)
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4.7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Using (2), the governments problem can be rewritten as
max
fBi()g
X
i
1Z
1
::
nZ
n
264 V (Bi(i))  (1 + )Ci(Bi(i); )  (1 + )Ui(i)+
(1 + )
iR

@Ci(Bi(x);x)dx
@i
375

n

i=1
fi(i)

dn:::::d1
subject to (1) and (3)
If (2) is satised then (3) holds if and only if
(30) Ui(i)  (   E[CMi (q; B i; i)]); 8i and i
Then, the governments objective function can be rewritten as
1Z
1
:::::
nZ
n
[V (Bi(i))  (1 + )Ci(Bi(i); i)  (1 + )
24   iZ

CMi (q; B i; xi)dx
35+ (I)
(1 + )
iZ

@Ci(Bi(x); x)dx
@i
]

n

i=1
fi(i)

dn:::::d1
subject to (1)
and given that  2 R and it is independent of types
X
i
1Z
1
:::::
nZ
n
26664
V (Bi(i))  (1 + )Ci(Bi(i); i) + (1 + )
iR

CMi (q; B i; xi)dx
+(1 + )
iR

@Ci(Bi(x);x)dx
@i
37775

n

i=1
fi(i)

dn:::::d1 (1 + )
nX
i=1

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s.t. (1)
Applying integration by parts to the following elements, we obtain
Z

24 iZ

@Ci(Bi(x); x)dx
@i
35 n
i=1
fi(i)

dn:::::d1 = (II)
Z

Ci(Bi(i); i)
@i
d 
Z

Ci(Bi(i); i)
@i
F ()d =
Z

Ci(Bi(i); i)
@i
[1  F (i)] di
Thus,
Z

24 iZ

CMi (q; B i; xi)dx
35 n
i=1
fi(i)

dn:::::d1 = (III)
Z

CMi (q; B i; i)d  
Z

CMi (q; B i; i)F ()d =
Z

CMi (q; B i; i) [1  F (i)] di
Substituting (II) and (III) into (I), we obtain the governments relaxed maximization problem
max
fBi()gi6=0
Z

X
i
[V (Bi(i))  (1 + )Ci(Bi(i); i)+
+(1 + )

CMi (q; B i; i)
1  F (i)
f(i)
+
@Ci(Bi(i); i)
@i
1  F (i)
f(i)


n

i=1
fi(i)

dn::d1 
nX
i=1

subject to (1).
Hence, the rst order condition with respect to Bi is
V (Bi(i))
dBi
  (1 + )Ci(Bi(); )
@Bi
+ (1 + )
@2Ci(Bi(); )
@Bi@i
1  F (i)
f(i)
= 0
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That is,
V (Bi(i))
dBi
= (1 + )

Ci(Bi(); i)
@Bi
  1  F (i)
f(i)
@2Ci(Bi(i); i)
@Bi@i

(IV)
Optimal transfer t
In order to nd the optimal transfer, derive the governments utility, Ug(Bi) = V (Bi)  ti (Bi),
with respect to B.
Ug(Bi)
dB
=
V (Bi)
dB
 t

i (Bi)
dB
= 0
And since we have that
V (Bi)
dB
=
ti (Bi)
dB
;
Integrating with respect to B and using (IV) we have that:
ti () = (1 + )

Ci(Bi(); )  1  F (i)
f(i)
@Ci(Bi(); )
@

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4.8 APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 3
Figures 17-18
Figure 17: Assumption 5 (a)
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Figure 18: Assumption 5 (b)
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4.8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Since sNCi (sj) and s
C
i (sj), then
@sCi (sj)
@sj
=
@sNCi (sj)
@sj
+
"
1  @s
Ri
j (si; sj)
@sj
#
where @Di(si;sj)
@sj
= 1  @s
Ri
j (si;sj)
@sj
given that Di (si; sj)  sj sRij (si; sj). Hence, @s
C
i (sj)
@sj
 @sNCi (sj)
@sj
since 1  @s
Ri
j (si;sj)
@sj
by denition.
4.8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We rst show that player is best response functions when she is concerned about player js foregone
options and when she is not, respectively, sCi (sj)2 argmax
si2Si
UCi (si; sj), and s
NC
i (sj)2 argmax
si2Si
UNCi (si; sj), contain a single point. Then, we show the result stated in proposition 1.
Note that player is utility function when she is concerned about player js unchosen alterna-
tives, UCi (si; sj), is strictly concave in si and it is dened over a strictly convex domain. This
guarantees that player is best response function sCi (sj)2 argmax
si2Si
UCi (si; sj) contains a single
point. A similar argument is also applicable for player is utility function when she does not assign
any relevance to player js foregone options, UNCi (si; sj), since it is also strictly concave in si and
it is dened over a strictly convex domain. Hence, sNCi (sj)2 argmax
si2Si
UNC(si; sj) also contains
a single point.
Once we know that player is best response function is unique, we just have to compare them
in the intervals where Di (si; sj)  0 and Di (si; sj) < 0 in order to check if proposition 1 is
satised. Let us show it by contradiction. Hence, let us assume that sCi (sj) < s
NC
i (sj) when
sj  sRij (si; sj) (i.e. Di (si; sj)  0). Then, for a function ~si (sj) 2 Si su¢ ciently close to
sNCi (sj),
UCi
 
sNCi (sj) ; sj
 UCi (~si (sj) ; sj)  UNCi (sNCi (sj) ; sj)  UNCi (~si (sj) ; sj) = 0
That is, player is marginal utility of raising her strategy when evaluated at the maximizer
when she is unconcerned about foregone options, sNCi (sj), is below the marginal utility she could
achieve by using this same strategy sNCi (sj) when she is not concerned about player js unchosen
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alternatives, which is by denition zero. But this would violate assumption A5 (reciprocity), which
states that, when Di (si; sj)  0,
UCsi (si; sj)  UNCsi (si; sj)
must hold for any action s0i su¢ ciently close to si, including s
NC
i (sj). Hence, s
C
i (sj) < s
NC
i (sj)
whenDi (si; sj)  0 cannot be true. Similarly for sCi (sj) > sNCi (sj) whenDi (si; sj) < 0. Hence,
it can only be true that
sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj) for all Di (si; sj) > 0
sCi (sj) < s
NC
i (sj) for all Di (si; sj)  0
4.8.3 Proof of Lemma 2
From proposition 1 we know that the di¤erence between player is best response function when
she is concerned and unconcerned about foregone options, sCi (sj)  sNCi (sj), is weakly increasing
in the distance Di (si; sj). In addition, by assumption A1 we have that player js utility function
UNCj (sj; si) is strictly increasing in si. Hence,
UNCj
 
sj; s
C
i (sj)
  UNCj  sj; sNCi (sj) is weakly increasing in Di (si; sj)
Therefore, for two actions sj; s0j 2 Sj such that s0j > sj , we have that Di
 
si; s
0
j

> Di (si; sj),
what implies that
UNCj
 
s0j; s
C
i
 
s0j
  UNCj  s0j; sNCi  s0j  UNCj  sj; sCi (sj)  UNCj  sj; sNCi (sj)
and rearranging,
UNCj
 
s0j; s
C
i (sj)
  UNCj  sj; sCi (sj)  UNCj  s0j; sNCi  s0j  UNCj  sj; sNCi (sj)
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4.8.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us sCj and s
NC
j denote the leaders equilibrium strategies when dealing with a concerned and
not concerned follower, respectively. Let us prove sCj > s
NC
j by contradiction. Hence, assume that
sCj < s
NC
j . If this is the case, then the leaders marginal utility from raising her action must be
higher when the follower is unconcerned about foregone options than when he assigns a positive
importance to them. But this contradicts lemma 2. In particular, recall that lemma 2 states that
the marginal utility of raising the proposers action is higher for the rst mover when the second
mover is concerned about unchosen alternatives than when he is not. Hence sCj < s
NC
j must be
false, and proposition 2 is satised.
4.8.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Using Segal and Sobel (1999), we know that player is preferences over player js actions can be
represented by
UCi (si; sj) = iU
NC
i (si; sj) + jU
NC
j (sj; si) where i; j 2 R
if preferences satisfy continuity and independence, as well as Segal and Sobels (1999) condition
(F) which states that
if UNCi (s
0
i; sj) = U
NC
i (si; sj) , then s
0
i i si (F)
which are all satised in our model.
4.8.6 Proof of Lemma 3
Let us consider the receivers utility function when he assigns a positive importance to the pro-
posers foregone options and when he does not, respectively, UCi (si; sj; Sj) = xi + i(xi f i),
and UNCi (si; sj) = xi. First, assumption A1 is satised since U
NC
i
 
A; s0j
  UNCi  A; s0j and
UNCi
 
R; s0j
  UNCi (R; sj) for all sj since x0i > xi if and only if s0j > sj . Additionally, A2
(concavity) is satised since
@2UCi
 
UNCi ; Di

@s2i
=
@2UNCi (si; sj)
@s2i
= 0
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A3 is trivially satised by player i. Regarding assumption A4 (kindness) is satised since
UCi (si; sj) > U
NC
i (si; sj) since xi + i(xi f i) > xi if xi> f i
UCi (si; sj) = U
NC
i (si; sj) since xi + i(xi f i) = xi if xi= f i
UCi (si; sj) < U
NC
i (si; sj) since xi + i(xi f i) < xi if xi< f i
Finally, A5 (reciprocity) is also satised, since in their model, s0i > si, if and only if s
0
i = A
and si = R, what implies that for all Di(si; sj)  0 (i.e., xi  fi)
UCi (s
0
i; sj)  UCi (si; sj)  UNCi (s0i; sj)  UNCi (si; sj)
() xi + i(xi f i)  0  xi   0 for any xi < fi
and when Di(si; sj) < 0 (i.e., xi < fi), since
[xi + i(xi   fi)]  0 < xi   0 for any xi < fi
4.8.7 Proof of Lemma 4
Let (xj; xi) denote the proposed allocation that the proposer o¤ers to the responder. We know
that the responder will accept any o¤er xi if and only if the utility he gets by accepting is weakly
above than the (zero) utility he gets by rejecting. That is, xi + i(xi f i) = 0 () xi= i1+ifi.
Let us now check for su¢ ciency. Note that the responder does not to accept any o¤er xi < xi.
Instead, accepting any o¤er xi < xi would imply negative utility levels, and the responder would be
better o¤ by rejecting such an o¤er, obtaining zero utility. Thus, xi < xi cannot be an equilibrium
strategy.
Finally we need to check that the responder does not reject any o¤er above xi. Let us assume
that the responder sets an acceptable threshold x^i > xi. Then, any o¤er xi such that xi < xi < x^i
would be rejected, and the responder would nd that accepting it constitutes a protable deviation.
Therefore, the acceptance threshold cannot be strictly above xi. Hence, the responder does not
accept any o¤er xi 2 [0; xi), but accepts any o¤er weakly above this threshold level xi.
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4.8.8 Proof of Proposition 4
From lemma 8 we know the responders acceptance threshold. Since the proposer wants to maximize
the remaining portion of the pie which is not o¤ered to the receiver and guarantees that the
receiver accepts such divisionhe o¤ers i
1+i
fi. This is preferred by the proposer rather than not
participating when his remaining share of the pie 1  i
1+i
fi > 0. That is, the proposer makes the
minimal o¤er i
1+i
fi if and only if fi <
1+i
i
. Since fi 2 [0; 1] and 1 < 1+ii for any i  0, then
the previous condition fi <
1+i
i
is satised for any i  0. Therefore, the proposer makes the
minimal o¤er i
1+i
fi for any parameter values.
4.8.9 Proof of Lemma 5
Let us consider the workers utility function when he assigns a positive importance to the proposers
foregone options and when he does not. Respectively, UCi (si; sj) = xi   e2 + i(xi   fi)e and
UNCi (si; sj) = xi   e2. Therefore, assumption A1 is satised since UNCi
 
si; s
0
j
  UNCi (si; sj)
for any si and any s0j > sj since
@UNCi (si;sj)
@sj
= 1  0. Additionally, A2 (concavity) is also satised
since
@2UCi (si; sj)
@e2
=
@2UCi (si; sj)
@e2
=  2 < 0
A3 is trivially satised by player i. Additionally, A4 (kindness) holds since
UCi (si; sj) > U
NC
i (si; sj) since xi   e2 + i(xi   fi)e > xi   e2 for any xi > fi
UCi (si; sj) = U
NC
i (si; sj) since xi   e2 + i(xi   fi)e = xi   e2 for any xi = fi
UCi (si; sj) < U
NC
i (si; sj) since xi   e2 + i(xi   fi)e < xi   e2 for any xi < fi
On the other hand, A5 (reciprocity) as well since si= e and
@UCi (si;sj)
@e
=  2e +  (xi   fi)
and
@UNCi (si;sj)
@e
=  2e, then
@UCi (si; sj)
@e
 (<)@U
NC
i (si; sj)
@e
if Di (si; sj)  (<) 0
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4.8.10 Proof of Lemma 6
The workers optimal amount of e¤ort to exert as a function of the wage proposal o¤ered by the
rm, e(xi), can be obtained from solving the following utility maximization problem
max
e2R+
UCi (si; sj) = xi   e2 + i(xi   fi(xi))e
Di¤erentiating with respect to e, and manipulating, we have
e(xi) =
8<: 12i (xi   fi(xi)) if xi > fi(xi)0 otherwise
For su¢ ciency, just note that the worker will never respond to an o¤er xi by exerting a higher
e¤ort level than the one specied in e(xi). Indeed, on the one hand, if he exerts higher e¤ort levels,
he will have more disutility from such e¤ort than the utility he derives from the third term of the
above utility function for xi > fi(xi). On the other hand, if he exerts less e¤ort, then the marginal
utility from exerting additional e¤ort when xi > fi (third term of the utility function) would be
greater than the marginal disutility from exerting e¤ort (second term). Hence, the worker would
be better o¤ by exerting more e¤ort. Hence, the above e¤ort level e(xi) is optimal for the worker
when the wage o¤ered is xi.
4.8.11 Proof of Proposition 5
As shown in the lemma 2, the workers optimal e¤ort level is e (xi) = max

1
2
i (xi   fi(xi)) ; 0
	
.
Regarding the employer o¤er,we know that the employer inserts the above best response func-
tion into his utility function, in order to nd the optimal wage o¤er. max
xi2[0;1]
(v   xi)e(xi). Hence,
xi =
v (1  f 0i(xi )) + fi(xi)
2  f 0i(xi )
2 argmax (v   xi)e(xi)
Note that the employer prefers to o¤er xi =
v(1 f 0i(xi ))+fi(xi)
2 f 0i(xi ) , where x

i > fi(x

i ) since v > 1
and f 0i(xi) < 1, and induce a positive e¤ort level from the worker, rather than o¤ering any wage
level x^i < fi(x^i) which induces no e¤ort; see e (xi). Indeed, the employers equilibrium utility level
from o¤ering xi is V = (v   xi ) 12i (xi   fi(xi )), which is positive for any parameter values.
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Instead, if the employer makes any o¤er x^i < fi(x^i), the worker exerts no e¤ort, and UF = 0.
Hence, xi is indeed the equilibrium wage o¤er.
Finally, in order to check for the workers voluntary participation, we need to nd what is the
minimum o¤er to be accepted by the worker. That is, we must nd a wage o¤er sj=xi such that
UC(si; sj; Sj) = 0.
xi e(xi)2+i(xi fi(xi))e(xi) = 0
() xi 

max

1
2
i(xi   fi(xi)); 0
2
+i(xi f i)max

1
2
i(xi   fi(xi)); 0

= 0
In the case in which the foregone option fi(xi) > xi, then the above expression is reduced to
xi = 0. That is, any wage o¤er is accepted. On the other hand, in the case in which fi(xi) < xi,
then, we can reduce the above expression to xi=
 2+2i fi(xi)+2
p
1 2i fi(xi)
2i
, which is always negative,
for any values of i and fi(xi). Therefore, the minimum o¤er to be accepted by the worker in both
cases (xi > fi(xi) and xi < fi(xi)) will be xi = 0, since we are assuming that the rm cannot
make any negative o¤ers. Note that in the case that f 0i(xi) = 0 then x

i becomes x

i =
v+fi(xi)
2
.
4.8.12 Proof of Lemma 7
Lets us consider two cases, rst, the case when the responders utility function assigns a posi-
tive importance to the proposers foregone options and , second, when he does not, respectively,
UCi (si; sj) = zi +

m (si + sj)

1 + i
 
sj   sRj
0:5
and UNCi (si; sj) = zi + [m(si + sj)]
0:5.
Therefore, assumption A1 is satised since UNCi
 
si; s
0
j
  UNCi (si; sj) for any si and sj > sj
given that
@UNCi (si;sj)
@sj
= m
2[m(si+sj)]
0:5 > 0 for any parameter values.
Similarly, A2 (concavity) is also satised since
@2UCi (si; sj)
@s2i
=   m
2
4 [m (si + sj)]
3=2
 0
@2UCi (si; sj)
@s2i
=   m
2(1 + i(sj   sRj ))2
4

m(si + sj)

1 + i(xi   sRj )
3=2  0
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A3 is trivially satised by player i. In addition, A4 (kindness) is satised given that
UCi (si; sj) > U
NC
i (si; sj) for any sj > s
R
j
UCi (si; sj) = U
NC
i (si; sj) for any sj = s
R
j
UCi (si; sj) < U
NC
i (si; sj) for any sj < s
R
j
On the other hand, A5 holds as well since
@UCi (si;sj)
@si
=  1 + m(1+i(sj sRj ))
2[m(si+sj)[1+i(sj sRj )]]
0:5 and
@UNCi (si;sj)
@si
=  1 + m
2[m(si+sj)]
0:5 , then it is easy to show that
@UCi (si; sj)
@si
 (<)@U
NC
i (si; sj)
@si
if sj  (<)sRj
4.8.13 Proof of Lemma 8
The responders utility maximization problem is just given by
max
zi;G
UCi (si; sj) = max
zi;G
zi +

mG

1 + i
 
sj   sRj
0:5
subject to zi + si = wi
si + sj = G
si; zi > 0
Using zi = wi   si and si + sj = G in UCi (si; sj), we can reduce the above program to
max
si
UCi (si; sj)= max
si
w
i
 si+

m (si + sj)

1 + i
 
sj   sRj
0:5
Di¤erentiating with respect to si, and manipulating, we nd the best response function for the
second mover concerned about the rst movers foregone options.
sCi (sj) =
8><>:
m(1 isRj )
4
   1 + im
4

sj if sj 2

0;
m(1 isRj )
4 im

0 if sj  m(1 is
R
j )
4 im
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4.8.14 Proof of Lemma 9
Regarding the rst mover (player i), we know that he inserts the above best response function of
the follower into his utility function, UNCj (sj; si) = w   sj + [m (si + sj)]0:5which is maximized
at sj =
16(isRj  1)+2im2
16i
. However, this expression is positive only for su¢ ciently high values of
i. In particular,
16(isRj  1)+2im2
16i
> 0 if and only if i >
16
16sRj +m
= i. Therefore,
sj =
8<: 0 if i < i16(isRj  1)+2im2
16i
otherwise
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